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QUASI-INQUISITORIALISM: ACCOUNTING
FOR DEFERENCE IN PRETRIAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Jennifer E. Laurin*
ABSTRACT
Police and prosecutorial activities that take place long before a criminal trial are frequently
critical to, even dispositive of, the accuracy and reliability of case disposition. At the same time,
the regulatory touch of constitutional criminal procedure in the pretrial realm is insistently light.
Proposals to address actual or risked deficiencies in this arena have proliferated in recent years,
exemplified by pushes for social-science-rooted investigative best practices, for broader defense
access to evidence prior to trial, for more oversight in plea bargaining, and so on. But in the face
of these critiques, broad pretrial discretion largely reigns.
A prevailing explanation for this state of affairs is rooted in our putative preference for an
accusatory rather than inquisitorial system of criminal justice. And the leading solutions on
offer frequently urge at least a partial turn away from adversarial obsession to embrace more
inquisitorial traditions. The central argument of this Article is that this prevailing account is
incomplete, and that the gaps have real world consequences for criminal justice reform. The
Article uncovers an additional and consequential strain in the doctrinal narrative, one that
depicts the pretrial world as the very inquisitorial, Continental mode that is so roundly rejected in
the context of adjudication. This “quasi-inquisitorialism” in turn enables the Court to construct
a separate realm of prosecutorial and police bureaucracy, professionalism, and expertise that
purportedly fills the gap in judicial oversight. In addition to offering a fuller explanation of the
structure of the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, this account aims for greater
leverage for reform. The Article concludes by suggesting that exploiting this quasi-inquisitorial
narrative might offer promising inroads—doctrinally, politically, or both—for reformed
approaches to investigative oversight, pretrial discovery, and plea bargaining.
© 2014 Jennifer E. Laurin. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
A man is arrested for robbery when a trained dog “matches” his scent to
scraps of cloth at the crime scene, despite contradictory security video footage.1 Another is convicted of theft based upon a witness who identifies him
as she looks down from a fourth floor apartment into a dark parking lot.2 An
innocent young man pleads guilty to robbery after a sample of his DNA
matches blood shed at the scene, only to be exonerated five years later when
a laboratory mix-up comes to light and his cousin’s DNA is found to be the
true match.3 A woman pleads guilty to fraud charges, not knowing that a key
witness in the case had told FBI agents that the defendant’s allegedly false
statements were true.4
All of these cases share three features: they are real; they raise evident
reliability and accuracy concerns; and, emanating as they do from evidence
gathering and evaluation that occurs prior to trial, they are largely beyond
criminal procedure’s trial-focused regulatory reach.
The variety of ways in which pretrial activities have the potential to generate error is increasingly well documented. Social science research in particular has made valuable if unsettling contributions in this arena,
demonstrating among other things that long-standard investigative techniques in relation to eyewitnesses and confessions raise serious accuracy concerns, that what passes as scientific evidence is sometimes unreliable in its
foundations or in the manner in which it is generated, and that a variety of
cognitive and motivational biases can lead investigations astray and confound
the ability to catch errors down the road.5 So, too, has recent work in law
and social science illuminated the extent to which errors in gathering and
assessing evidence prior to trial can “contaminate” a criminal investigation,
be falsely corroborated through a variety of procedural missteps and cognitive errors, and remain undetected through systematic accuracy defects in
the crucible of trial.6 Of course, we might be less concerned about the prevalence of pretrial error given that some ninety-six percent of defendants sim1 John Schwartz, Picked from a Lineup, on a Whiff of Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/us/04scent.html?_r=0.
2 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721–22 (2012).
3 Lawrence Mower & Doug McMurdo, Las Vegas Police Reveal DNA Error Put Wrong
Man in Prison, LAS VEGAS REV. J., July 7, 2011, http://www.lvrj.com/news/dna-relatederror-led-to-wrongful-conviction-in-2001-case-125160484.html.
4 United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 176–77 (5th Cir. 2009).
5 See, e.g., COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 127–82 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]; Keith A. Findley &
Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
291; Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615.
6 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 5–13 (2011); RICHARD A.
LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 266–67 (2008); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT 3
(2012).
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ply admit guilt.7 And yet guilty pleas themselves introduce nontrivial
accuracy concerns given the breadth of criminal law, the range and severity
of sentences, and prosecutors’ nearly unfettered discretion to bargain with
charges and punishment, and extract finality-preserving (and potentially
accuracy-thwarting) waivers of rights to discovery, post-conviction review, and
even the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.8
This state of affairs exists in large part thanks to the structure of American criminal procedure doctrine, which relies almost entirely on trial-based
procedures to guarantee accuracy and approaches the pretrial realm with a
comparatively light regulatory touch. Yes, the Fourth Amendment imposes
some pretrial gatekeeping through warrant doctrine and the requirements of
probable cause, but these purposely “flexible” strictures are protective of significant police discretion, and the Court has repeatedly resisted the suggestion that heightened reliability concerns (such as, for example, reliance on
anonymous informants) should alter such an approach.9 Notwithstanding
efforts by the Warren Court to shine the light of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in the dark corners of police precincts, criminal procedure doctrine protects against little other than deliberate law enforcement
overreach in the course of an investigation—again, even in the face of
demonstrable risks of error in evidence gathering (as, for example, with
unreliable eyewitnesses or apparently schizophrenic confessors).10 Similarly
immune from accuracy-focused scrutiny are the assessment, charging, and
even dispositional decisions made by prosecutors: the constitution demands
little if any evidentiary disclosure, imposes no conditions on the terms of bar7 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ234184, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, at 12 (Dec.
2011) [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2009 STATISTICS) (“Ninety-seven percent of convictions in U.S. district court in 2009 were the result of guilty pleas, compared to 96% in
2005.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES,
2006, at 1 (May 2010) [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2006 STATISTICS] (reporting that 95%
of state convictions were through guilty plea).
8 See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance—Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013) (explaining why courts will likely continue
to enforce waivers in plea deals that waive the defendant’s right to later raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and arguing that this is unwise); Samuel R. Wiseman,
Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952 (2012) (reviewing doctrine and concerns in this
area).
9 See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239
(1983); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881
(1991) (making the point that the flexible and common sense attributes of probable cause
are hallmarks of its deference to police judgment, but also arguing that pre-search review
by magistrates and post-search review by courts actually entail review of differing levels of
stringency).
10 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (rejecting suggestion
that unreliability of eyewitness evidence renders its use at trial unconstitutional absent “the
taint of improper state conduct”); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against certain types of police interrogatory techniques).
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gains, and seemingly permits waiver of any right conceivably characterized as
knowing and voluntary.11
The magnitude of our criminal justice system’s accuracy problem is
widely debated, but the notion that it is nontrivial and that greater attention
to pretrial activities is an important part of the solution is widely accepted.12
Moreover, there is wide agreement among critics about the general character
(if not the details) of attention that is required. Investigative practices
should be more systematized and regulated to reflect what is known about
best practices especially in relation to eyewitnesses, interrogations, informants, and forensic science; defendants should have greater access to discovery and the state’s investigative apparatus prior to trial, and especially in
connection with evaluating plea offers; and plea bargaining, including the
terms of offers and the rights that can and cannot be on the bargaining table,
should be scrutinized to ensure that prosecutors are not de facto final
adjudicators.13
But it is equally well understood that courts, the Supreme Court chief
among them, have by and large remained on the sidelines in these debates.
Again and again, the Supreme Court has, by wide majorities, rejected invitations to refashion constitutional criminal procedure to feature reliability
guarantees beyond those provided by fair trials. Two terms ago in Florida v.
Harris, a unanimous Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court’s effort to
scrutinize the reliability of drug-sniffing dogs, insisting in the face of evidence
of that technology’s questionable accuracy that demanding and scientifically
guided tests of reliability were inconsistent with the “flexible” conception of
probable cause contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.14 In the previous
11 See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (rejecting an extension of
Brady to the pretrial plea stage); United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995)
(holding that a waiver of exclusionary plea-bargaining rules is not unconstitutional if it is
made voluntarily and knowingly); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (holding that the prosecutors did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by carrying out a
threat made during plea negotiations). Enhancing the prosecutorial power that results
from this deference is the minimal constitutional scrutiny that noncapital sentencing
receives under Eighth Amendment doctrine. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 594–95 (2001).
12 For general affirmation of this proposition from a diversity of participants in and
observers of the criminal justice system, see AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE
INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY (2006); Brad Smith et al., How Justice System Officials
View Wrongful Convictions, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 663, 670–75 (2011); JON B. GOULD ET AL.,
PREDICTING ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE, at iii (Dec. 2012), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/241389
.pdf. But see Improving Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Scott Burns, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n) (touting “99.9999%” accuracy of criminal justice system as “a pretty good track
record”).
13 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 12; GARRETT, supra note 6, at 244–60; Darryl K.
Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1591 (2005).
14 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055–56 (2013).
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Term, eight Justices in Perry v. New Hampshire rejected the notion that due
process forbid admission of unreliable eyewitness identifications in the
absence of police misconduct, in an opinion that read almost as if the last
three decades of research about the risks of eyewitness identification
(research that pervaded the parties’ briefs) had not transpired.15 The
Court—frequently a significant majority of it—is clear-eyed in declining to
adapt our constitutional regulatory regime to the lessons of the last
decades.16
Of course, judicially fashioned, constitutionally rooted criminal procedure is far from the only or most meaningful doctrinal space that might
attend to pretrial reliability concerns. Yet extrajudicial arenas for oversight
have to date yielded less change than critics might have hoped. Greater oversight of investigators and prosecutors through subconstitutional judicial doctrine such as state evidence law or rules of criminal procedure, as well as
organizational reform in this arena, are by and large exceptions to a rule of
continuing down the standard (Court-modeled) path.17 In other words,
despite the changed, more accuracy-focused backdrop for criminal justice
reform conversations, the basic structure of criminal oversight continues
largely to track the structure of the Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence.
What explains both the presumption and endurance of pretrial deference? Legal realist accounts aside, there is a prevailing understanding of the
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence that is frequently offered by the
Court, and held up by commentators, as justifying or at least explaining doctrinal inattention to pretrial reliability concerns: the notion that “ours is an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system.”18 As the story goes, more or
less constitutionalized (American) values of individual autonomy and limited
state insinuation prevail over (foreign) technocratic and bureaucratic idealization of substantive accuracy; judges are umpires rather than invested participants in development of the case, and parties to litigation independently
develop and present oral narratives subject to cross examination and evalu15 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (making the same point).
16 See Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary
Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 737 (2013) (“The retreat from evidentiary
reliability as a constitutional principle . . . appears complete.”).
17 See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1413, 1419 (2010) (observing that just as the judiciary has been loath to scrutinize
prosecutorial activities, “[l]awmakers also have been wary to hamper prosecutors and
instead have facilitated the prosecutorial function through the passage of more crimes and
harsher punishments,” and internal regulation has been sporadic and “often employing
hortatory language or pitched at a level of generality that confines little”); Sandra Guerra
Thompson, Eyewitness Identifications and State Courts as Guardians Against Wrongful Conviction, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 603, 628–31 (2010) (discussing minority examples of reformed
approaches to oversight of eyewitness identification evidence); Jenia Iontcheva Turner,
Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212–13
(2006) (discussing outlier approaches in oversight of plea bargaining).
18 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
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ated by neutral factfinders; and procedural interventions enforced by the
court do little more than police the playing field on which the parties’ dialectic truth-elucidation occurs.19 Accordingly, the Constitution does not
require, and the theoretical underpinnings of our system of criminal justice
militate against, constructions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments that would insert overweening, Continental-style courts in
greater oversight of pretrial evidence gathering, case evaluation, charging,
and disposition.20 All this is the outgrowth of what David Sklansky has
termed the Court’s “anti-inquisitorial” commitment.21
Anti-inquisitorialism has not gone unchallenged. From some quarters,
the critique has been normative; scholars have urged ending or at least loosening anti-inquisitorialism’s hold on American criminal procedure, to adopt
some of the doctrines and institutional arrangements that are more a feature
of Continental criminal law and that, those scholars argue, are better
designed than the status quo to achieve reliable outcomes.22 Other
pushback has centered on the accuracy of anti-inquisitorialism as a positive
account of our criminal justice system. Judge Gerard Lynch’s seminal article
on plea bargaining as “administrative justice” is a classic example of a
broader literature suggesting that pure adversarial justice is, for better or for
worse, a myth readily debunked by examining American criminal justice in
action.23 But comparatively little work has been done to assess the premise
19 See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 330–31
(2003) (discussing role of procedure in preventing rather than correcting error); Mirjan
Damas̆ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 554–87 (1973); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two
Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016–19
(1974) (discussing connections between theoretical and technical facets of accusatorial
criminal procedure); Luna & Wade, supra note 17, at 1429 (contrasting party versus judicially based responsibility for development of facts in adversarial and inquisitorial systems);
see also Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1187–88 (2005) (discussing the closely related adversarial ideal in American civil litigation).
20 See infra Part I.
21 See generally David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634
(2009).
22 See GEORGE C. THOMAS III, SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL 181–222 (2008); LLOYD L.
WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 117–46 (1977); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 887–88 (2009)
(proposing institutional checks on combined investigative and adjudicative role of prosecutors consistent with inquisitorial bureaucratic models); Brown, supra note 13, at 1591
(pointing to extra-judicially generated procedures and institutions that are superior substitutes for failed adversarial procedures); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 900–01 (2008);
Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 319, 334–35 (2011) (proposing adoption of many inquisitorial doctrines and
institutions).
23 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2118 (1998) (arguing that because of plea bargaining “the American system as it
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that the anti-inquisitorial narrative is in fact an important driver in the
Court’s hands-off stance toward pretrial activities.
This Article aims to problematize that account by suggesting that
embracing the anti-inquisitorial narrative as a central justificatory account for
American criminal procedure has obscured a distinct and important counterpunctual theme in the Court’s own jurisprudence concerning the pretrial
realm: one that this Article dubs “quasi-inquisitorialism.” To be sure, the
Court frequently declines to intervene in the regulation of pretrial activities
on the ground that “our” system of adversarial justice contraindicates such a
result. But often the Court simultaneously offers a positive depiction of how
it conceives of the non-accusatory space where oversight is eschewed, in
which it imbues police, prosecutors, and their respective institutional contexts with characteristics more resonant with certain features of the Continental rather than common law adversarial tradition—in particular,
bureaucratic accountability, intrinsically or professionally inculcated accuracy-based orientations, and discernible, extrajudicial expertise.24
Thus, for example, throughout its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the Court has pushed back against technically exacting standards for probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and has diminished the prospect for exclusion of evidence. But it has done so while characterizing law enforcement
regulatory regimes and professional expertise as operating to constrain the
discretion otherwise afforded by lack of judicial legal review.25 Similarly, in
regard to the prosecutorial role, the Court has repeatedly advanced a conception of the prosecutorial function as being meaningfully overseen
through a professionally inculcated justice-seeking orientation, mechanisms
of internal, administrative regulation that guide prosecutorial discretion, and
actually operates in most cases looks much more like what common lawyers would describe
as a non-adversarial, administrative system of justice than like the adversarial model they
idealize,” and proposing injection of adversarialism into plea bargaining process); see
Brown, supra note 13, at 1590; Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to
American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care,
78 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 664–65 (1990); Goldstein, supra note 19, at 1021–25 (characterizing
American criminal procedure as a mix of both accusatorial and inquisitorial systems and
briefly detailing historical and contemporary inquisitorial features); Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, in 41 PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 9 (Michael Tonry ed., 2012) (“In the United States, trials are
comparatively rare.”).
24 See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Reporting for Duty: The Universal
Prosecutorial Accountability Puzzle and an Experimental Transparency Alternative, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 392, 401 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds.,
2012) (contrasting American and Continental norms of prosecutorial accountability as
being primarily political in the former case, and primarily professional and bureaucratic in
the latter); Mirjan Damas̆ka, Adversary System, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 24,
28–29 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (pointing to “nonpartisan” investigation, “self-propelling” officials “affirmatively obligated to carry out state policies” as hallmarks of inquisitorial model).
25 See infra Part II.
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viable claims to comparative expertise with regard to review, charging, and
even (in the context of pleas) case disposition.26
Thus, while declining to fashion a pretrial judicial role resonant with
accounts of the interventionist, management-oriented, inquisitorial jurist, the
Court has found—or perhaps more accurately assumed—the presence of
some of the very institutional features that often are held out as hallmarks of
more accuracy-focused Continental pretrial activities. To be sure, the point
is not to suggest that the Supreme Court itself intends to align pretrial
processes with an actual inquisitorial system—by, for example, consciously
pursuing a Frenchifying of American criminal investigations.27 Nor does the
Article intend to argue that the realm of pretrial practice in American criminal justice does indeed have the Continental indicia of reliability that the
Court posits. Rather, as the Article will discuss, there is ample reason to be
skeptical, perhaps even cynical, about the Court’s quasi-inquisitorial invocations.28 Nevertheless, there is value in taking seriously the Court’s justificatory premises, and revealing that the Court’s own depiction of “our” system
of criminal procedure has not been as wholly anti-inquisitorial as prevailing
accounts suggest.
That value is (at least) twofold. In a descriptive and analytic vein, the
contention of this Article is that quasi-inquisitorialism has real explanatory
power with respect to the Court’s pretrial criminal procedure doctrine,
despite the Court’s failure to expressly or consistently instantiate the paradigm in formal doctrine. Critically, the Court’s quasi-inquisitorial narrative is
as much a construct as its anti-inquisitorial framework, in that the empirical
assumptions on which the quasi-inquisitorial account rests are frequently
contestable or unrepresentative at best, and thin and disingenuous at worst.
But identifying those assumptions and accounting for how they have become
a feature of constitutional criminal procedure provides a clearer and richer
understanding of how the doctrine itself describes the field that it occupies.
Second, apart from the intrinsic value of a clarifying account, identifying
and illuminating the inquisitorial narrative offers a more practical cash-out.
The prevailing reform approach often frames the advocacy task as bucking a
powerful anti-inquisitorial self-understanding handed down from the Court.
In so doing, that tack essentially concedes the irrelevance of constitutional
doctrine for the progressive future of criminal justice. Moreover, scholarship
urging doctrinal reform in state courts, or greater legislative or rulemaking
26 See infra Part II.
27 Indeed, as many comparative criminal procedure scholars have observed, what precisely it would mean to “Frenchify” our more adversarial processes is contestable, given the
variations in on-the-ground “inquisitorial” practice and the absence of any “pure” form of
inquisitorial justice system. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and
Common Law Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471, 474 (1996) (arguing that the
adversarial and inquisitorial models are not so starkly distinguishable); Luna & Wade,
supra note 17, at 1464–65 (describing a spectrum of similarities between American and
European prosecutorial practice).
28 See infra Section II.C.
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action, has not grappled with the extent to which the Supreme Court’s antiinquisitorial narrative sets the terms for other actors’—most politically salient
among them law enforcement and prosecutors—public and internalized
accounts of how the criminal justice system should function. In other words,
the political feasibility of greater pretrial scrutiny, at least as much as its jurisprudential feasibility, hinges in part on offering a viable narrative for such a
scheme. An intuition driving this Article is that recovering the Court’s quasiinquisitorialism might offer a principled narrative for characterizing constraints on pretrial discretion as consistent with rather than departing from
“our” paradigm of criminal justice, thus grounding proposals for legislative
or institutional reform, or perhaps even a doctrinal shift, in relation to pretrial investigative and prosecutorial practices.29
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I elaborates on the breadth of discretion afforded police and prosecutors in their pretrial activities, and
presents the standard accusatorial explanation. Part I also describes prevailing views on how best to address the pretrial reliability deficit, and documents how many eschew traditional reification of “our” adversary system in
favor of concessions to inquisitorial approaches—concessions with which the
Court’s “anti-inquisitorial” paradigm has no truck. Part II identifies and
develops the theme of quasi-inquisitorialism, tracing the Court’s emergent
conception of police and prosecutors in the pretrial realm as working against
a backdrop of bureaucratic oversight and organizational or professional
norms and expertise that at least partially (putatively) fill the oversight gap in
criminal procedure doctrine. To be sure, the Court’s reliance on quasiinquisitorial attributes should rarely be taken at face value as a descriptive
matter. To this point, Part II explores at some length the causes and motivations behind quasi-inquisitorialism, and argues that they have structural qualities, and that the narrative is frequently a motivated strategy to diminish the
role of judicial oversight (as in the case of evidentiary exclusion) or to maintain the limited judicial role dictated by anti-inquisitorialism against the challenge mounted by innocence- and reliability-focused concerns.
Nevertheless, there are at least some signals that the Court should be
taken at its word in actually presuming—however unrealistically—the existence of quasi-inquisitorial constraints. Moreover, regardless of whether the
29 Cf. Kessler, supra note 19, at 1183 (arguing in the context of civil adjudication that
“recovering our lost inquisitorial tradition may offer our best chance to provide meaningful due process in the modern world of civil procedure”). Others have made the point that
accusatory justice is not just a legal but a cultural obsession. See, e.g., Gordon Van Kessel,
Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 505 (1992)
(“The basic assumptions underlying the nonadversary approach cut against the grain of
our national character. The American-style adversary system—with its emphasis on the
contest between the lawyers for the individual and for the state, rules designed to shield
the accused from the process, and extensive use of the lay jury—has its roots in the individualism, populism, and pluralism that are natural ingredients of our character and that
strongly influence our view of the proper structure and role of social and political institutions.” (citing Thomas Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European Criminal Procedures: True or
Illusive Models?, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 32 (1981))).
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Court’s anti-inquisitorial narrative has significant predictive force with
respect to its own jurisprudence, the Article suggests that it might supply a
viable tool of persuasion in criminal justice arenas that may be more receptive to an anti-inquisitorial counterweight—if only it were offered. Part III
closes by sketching general strategies for better leveraging the quasi-inquisitorial narrative, as well as both legal and political inroads that might be created
in the specific arenas of investigative practices, discovery reform, and plea
bargaining.
I.

PRETRIAL DISCRETION AND THE PERVASIVE YET INCOMPLETE
ANTI-INQUISITORIAL ACCOUNT
A.

The Pretrial-Adjudicatory Divide and Its Consequences

In the range of pretrial activities they undertake, police and prosecutors
famously enjoy broad discretion. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment formally serves as a pervasive regulatory backdrop for the work of law enforcement in the investigative stage of a case, particularly in relation to gathering
evidence, and to a lesser extent in making use of evidence prior to trial.
Thus, police ordinarily must make an advance showing of probable cause
and obtain a warrant to search for and seize evidence from one’s “person[ ],
house[ ], papers, and effects” (though not one’s car).30 But given the relatively low and factually contextual hurdle of probable cause, generously deferential post-hoc review of warrants, and diminished remedies in the criminal
and civil realms, Fourth Amendment doctrine serves as a fairly light substantive constraint in regard to law enforcement activity around evidence gathering.31 Warrant applications as well as charging decisions may be and typically
are premised on evidence that is a far cry from trial-based standards of reliability or admissibility.32 As a unanimous Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
(rejecting a Florida appellate court’s innovation), the “flexible” conception
of probable cause that has prevailed precludes the type of “judicial gatekeeping” that (at least nominally) regulates the quality of evidence considered at
trial from operating via the Fourth Amendment to review police and
prosecutorial determinations of probable guilt.33 But in all events, in the
mine-run of searches and seizures some exception to the warrant requirement—be it consent, exigency, searching incident to arrest, or any number
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990). For a
recent such seeming carve-out, see Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013).
31 See Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of Forensic
Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1051, 1085 (2013).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584–85 (1971); Bennett v. City of
Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, 405–06 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding polygraph results a valid
basis for probable cause determination though inadmissible at trial). See generally Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
33 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (rejecting an “inflexible” test for
reviewing reliability of dog sniff evidence that formed the basis for a warrant application);
Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 172–74 (rejecting notion that trial-based evidentiary standards applied
in assessing reliability of warrant).
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of other Court-sanctioned end-runs—means that the minimal friction provided by warrant doctrine is essentially absent, with deference to an officer’s
“reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity forming the outer limit of constitutional oversight.34
So too do the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide little opportunity for scrutinizing the reliability of evidence gathering and evaluation.
While the prohibition on compelled self-incrimination does speak directly to
a particular, and particularly important, form of evidence—namely, the confession and other testimonial statements35—its stringency is cabined. It prohibits the admission into evidence of a defendant’s statement procured
through police compulsion, but not, in the terminology of Professors Kassin
and Wrightsman, “voluntary false confessions” that, however unreliable, are
the product of the confessor’s own proclivities—such as the confession of a
schizophrenic in Colorado v. Connelly.36 Moreover, scrutiny of interrogations
is, even within narrow constitutional confines, notoriously light. Waivers of
rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona37 are readily obtained and rarely second-guessed.38 The Court has likewise made clear that the Constitution is
unconcerned with the per se reliability of eyewitnesses or informants, at least
in the absence of improper (perhaps deliberately improper) police conduct
in procuring the evidence.39 The Court continues formally to adhere to a
constitutional prohibition on the use of unduly suggestive procedures in procuring eyewitness identifications, but since Manson v. Brathwaite40 the twostep due process test of asking first whether suggestive procedures were used,
and then whether an out-of-court identification was nevertheless “reliable,”
has permitted most fruits of bad procedures to come into evidence, and has
used what social science has demonstrated to be highly questionable indicia
34 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
35 And critically, the prohibition does not speak to other, non-oral forms of evidence
that an individual might be compelled to surrender—personal effects, such as papers, or
non-oral attributes of their physical person, such as blood or voice exemplars. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 591 (1990) (discussing distinction between testimonial and
physical evidence, with only the former enjoying protection under the Fifth Amendment);
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not per se bar admission into evidence of business records created by the defendant).
36 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986); see Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67, 76 (S. Kassin & L.
Wrightsman eds., 1985).
37 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”).
38 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’
despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda
are rare.”); LEO, supra note 6, at 282–83.
39 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (rejecting suggestion
that unreliability of eyewitness evidence renders its use at trial unconstitutional absent “the
taint of improper state conduct”).
40 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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of “reliability” in doing so.41 Generally speaking, the requirements of due
process place no affirmative obligations on investigators in regard to evidence gathering,42 and absent a show of animus or physical mistreatment
toward a defendant it provides little negative constraint as well.
The same hands-off stance prevails to an even larger degree with regard
to prosecutorial conduct prior to trial. So long as probable cause is satisfied,
prosecutorial charging enjoys a presumption of regularity, rebutted only by
clear proof of misconduct—a standard that is (by design) all but impossible
to meet.43 The power afforded by charging discretion is of course vastly magnified by resistance (somewhat mitigated with the Court’s recent decisions in
Lafler v. Cooper44 and Missouri v. Frye45) to the notion that the plea bargaining, which displaces trial practice in the overwhelming majority of criminal
cases, should enjoy anything like the scrutiny that attends courtroom proceedings. Indeed, the Court has yet to identify a deal too sweet to be voluntary, a right too essential to be waivable, or a plea condition too offensive for
justice to permit.
Moreover, constitutional rules that would subject the prosecutor’s (and
police’s) actions to the scrutiny of the defense—in particular the rule of
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny entitling the defense, as a feature of due
process, to favorable information within the control of the state46—do little
or nothing to cure information asymmetries prior to trial. First, the scope of
Brady’s disclosure requirement is formally limited to information both
favorable and “material” to the defense—and thus excludes not only information relevant to the prosecution’s case more generally, but also (by the
terms of the Court’s doctrine) favorable information incapable by its own
force of affecting a juror’s judgment.47 So too has the Court rejected the
suggestion that in the ordinary course due process requires the state to make
available potentially favorable evidence—for example, physical evidence that,
upon forensic analysis, might yield relevant, even exculpatory, conclusions.48
But most critically, even information that falls within the ambit of Brady’s
mandate need not, consistent with the Constitution, be disclosed prior to
41 Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451, 468–75 (2012)
(summarizing social science research and the role of the Court’s due process test in insulating bad practices); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Blindness to Eyewitness Misidentification, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 639 (2009) (discussing pro-admissibility outcome).
42 See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145–46 (1979).
43 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
44 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
45 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
46 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674 (1985).
47 See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) (“We know of no constitutional
requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense
of all police investigatory work on a case.”).
48 See Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 549 (2004); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,
58 (1988).
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trial.49 In sum, the constitutional heart of criminal procedure—Sixth
Amendment rights and the guarantee of due process—is essentially viewed as
irrelevant to pretrial production or use of evidence (scientific or otherwise)
absent evidence of fabrication, framing, or other egregious misconduct.
But so what? None of this would be concerning if any one of three circumstances prevailed: if pretrial activities did not create systemic reliability
concerns; if constitutional criminal procedure protections that attend the
(more regulated space of) the trial were sufficient to address those concerns;
or if other subconstitutional strictures adequately filled the gap created by
the Court’s conception of pretrial discretion. Unfortunately none of the
three conditions is currently satisfied.
As to the first, others have documented in significant detail a state of
affairs that I merely summarize here. Evidence gathering and evaluation by
police and prosecutors create systemic, not just episodic, reliability concerns.
First, legal, scientific, and social scientific scholarship, along with the anecdotal evidence that can be gleaned from the hundreds of exonerations of the
last three decades, has shown that a range of traditional investigative techniques and tried-and-true evidentiary standbys deserve less confidence than
they have long enjoyed.50 Eyewitness evidence, long viewed with caution by
courts and practitioners,51 is in the DNA era vividly documented as being not
only highly error prone,52 but also systematically skewed by longstanding law
enforcement practices—non-blind lineup administration and positive feedback provided to witnesses, in particular.53 Research has demonstrated that
interrogation, particularly of certain population groups (e.g., the young, the
mentally ill) and when conducted in a manner consistent with techniques
long taught in police academies, generates not random but systematic risks of
error in the form of false confession.54 Scientific evidence is far from errorfree, and again here the concern is not simply the possibility of malevolent
fraud or isolated negligence, but structural conditions that undermine accuracy in the production and use of scientific evidence. Lack of professional
and institutional independence of forensic analysts from law enforcement
49 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1365 (2011); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 625 (2002).
50 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 6, at 6–13; National Registry of Exonerations, PROJECT OF
THE UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonera
tion/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (documenting more than a thousand
exonerations since 1989, most of which featured either eyewitness identifications, confessions, forensic evidence, or informant testimony).
51 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967).
52 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 178240, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT, at iii (1999) (cautioning about fallibility of eyewitnesses particularly in light
of DNA exonerations); GARY L. WELLS, MORE OF WHAT CHIEFS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 7 (2013) (summarizing eight studies showing, across the board,
that in approximately one-third of positive eyewitness identifications witnesses selected
innocent fillers).
53 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6, at 90–119 (summarizing social science evidence).
54 See LEO, supra note 6, at 231.
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customers raises concerns about bias and lack of incentive to develop robust
validation and quality control in the field.55
Moreover, lessons from the field of psychology illuminate that a variety
of cognitive as well as motivational biases confound the ability of police and
prosecutors to screen against the use of unreliable evidence and methods,
even given their vested interest in preventing both “type one” (false conviction) and “type two” (false acquittal) error.56 The very act of “committing” to
a particular suspect in an investigation—a mental leap that attends most critical pretrial activities such as conducting eyewitness procedures (in which a
chosen suspect participates), interrogating (in which a particular suspect’s
criminal involvement is vetted), testing evidence (in which at least sometimes
a particular individual’s suspected physical connection to a crime is analyzed), and (in the case of prosecutors) filing charges—disables rational,
well-motivated police and prosecutors from perceiving indicia of unreliability
in the evidence and methods described above. Such mental commitments
tend, despite best intentions, to drive individuals systematically to gather and
evaluate new evidence in a manner that confirms prior beliefs and discredits
contradictory beliefs—even when disconfirming evidence would be more
probative.57 These cognitive biases take hold in trained professionals no less
than among the lay public.58 Moreover, the professional and institutional
context in which police and prosecutors work can exacerbate motivational
bias that results not simply from hard-wired heuristic tendencies but from
more context-specific and conscious incentives and desires. Resource constraints, organizational and professional structures, and incentives (including
a vested interest in arrest and conviction) systematically undermine the reliability of police and prosecutorial judgments in evidence gathering and evalu-

55 See generally NAS REPORT, supra note 5.
56 See generally Findley & Scott, supra note 5.
57 For a review of the leading studies, see Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 176–84 (1998). More
recent work has documented confirmation bias in the law enforcement context. See, e.g.,
Karl Ask & Pär Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators’ Judgments of Witness Reliability, 37 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 579–80 (2007) (finding disconfirmation
bias regarding witness statements in study group of Swedish investigators); Barbara
O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and
Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1033 (2009) (documenting confirmation bias among individuals tasked to persuade others of their belief in
the guilt of a suspect).
58 See, e.g., Ask & Granhag, supra note 57, at 579–80 (identifying confirmation bias in a
controlled study of trained investigators); Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 499, 511–12 (1999) (finding that trained investigators were more likely
than lay people to incorrectly “detect” deception in suspects); Christian A. Meissner & Saul
M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 469, 478–79 (2002) (same); Eric Rassin, Blindness to Alternative Scenarios in Evidence
Evaluation, 7 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 153, 162 (2010) (same).
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ation.59 At bottom, the concern is that from the standpoint of accuracy in
criminal justice, the universe of pretrial activities is precisely where external
scrutiny should be at its peak, rather than (as the current doctrinal approach
dictates) at its nadir.
Conceding that fact, there is another ameliorating possibility: that trialbased protections are adequate to catch error that persists through the pretrial process. Unfortunately, this notion too turns out to be fanciful.60 Structural limitations on the defense capacity—including limited knowledge of
the state’s case and limited investigative resources—and sheer lack of counsel’s skill or will are surely one category of concern.61 But recent psychological research has shown as well that even under ideal laboratory conditions,
the tools of truth elucidation in which we place greatest faith—lay juror judgment and cross-examination—are less fool-proof than we imagine. Jurors, as
it turns out, systematically overestimate the credibility of government witnesses in general (especially police), and the reliability of two particularly
risky forms of evidence: eyewitness identification and confessions.62 Moreover, the traditional tools of interrogating this evidence at trial—cross-examination and consideration of whether individual facts are corroborated by
other evidence—are far less reliable tests than is typically understood.63 And
judicial gatekeeping under federal or state rules of evidence has not by and
large served as an effective backstop for a range of risky types of evidence—
with scientific evidence being the paradigmatic, but not the sole, example of
this weakness.64 More generally, judicial or jury assessment of reliability of
evidence can be thwarted by “pseudo-corroboration”—the susceptibility of
jurors (and others) to the allure of coherence in an evidentiary narrative,
combined with the risk that early investigative error is compounded by the
59 See Ask & Granhag, supra note 57, at 562–63 (discussing factors that generate motivational bias for investigators).
60 See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6, at 150–57, 160–62 (noting the jury’s reliance on eyewitness identification and confessions); Brown, supra note 13, at 1592–1612 (highlighting
the shortcomings of fact-finding for trials, the role and resources of prosecutors and investigators, the resources of defense counsel, the procedural rules at trial, and plea
bargaining).
61 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 13, at 1592–612; Michael McConville & Chester L.
Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581,
762 (1986–87) (reporting study results that defense counsel only interviewed witnesses and
visited crimes scenes in only 4% of non-homicide cases); Simon, supra note 6, at 150–57,
160–62.
62 See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE 46–48, 53–54 (2012) (summarizing
research demonstrating juror overestimation of reliability of confessions and value of witness confidence); LEO, supra note 6, at 266 (noting that jurors treat confessions as the best
evidence).
63 See GARRETT, supra note 6, at 247–52; SIMON, supra note 6, at 203–05.
64 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 127–82 (noting different types of scientific
evidence used in trials and some of their shortcomings); Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
S107, S109–10 (2005) (noting instances where flawed scientific evidence was not exposed
in court).
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accumulation of evidence that converges on an internally consistent but false
conclusion.65 In sum, trial doctrines and processes neither incentivize better
pretrial practices nor do nearly as good a job at detecting error as our faith in
the trial and the “unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent”
entailed by that institution would counsel.66
But there is a bigger systemic concern, which is that the criminal trial
itself borders on the illusory.67 In terms of sheer numbers the criminal trial
is vastly overshadowed by the system of plea bargaining that generates some
ninety-six percent of convictions.68 Adjudication by formal confession of liability would of course still be unproblematic if we had confidence that all
guilty pleas equated with actual guilt. Yet skepticism on that score is widespread—even from otherwise confident proponents of the status quo in criminal justice.69 The problem is multilayered: broad substantive criminal law
and high, sometimes mandatory, penalties provide prosecutors with significant leverage in plea negotiations, and defendants frequently lack both discovery to assess the true strength of the state’s case, as well as (in the special
case of the innocent defendant) reliable mechanisms to signal true lack of
guilt.70 Moreover, the high value of finality in the negotiated resolution of
cases—why, after all, would the state make a time-saving deal only to face
appellate litigation down the road?71—has fostered a regime in which the
rights that might guard against inaccurate outcomes are bargained away as
conditions of favorable treatment. As others have documented, discovery
waivers, waivers of the right to challenge the effectiveness of counsel, and

65 Cf. Neufeld, supra note 64, at S110.
66 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
67 Indeed when one considers the world of misdemeanor prosecutions it is almost
zero. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1353–65 (2012) (discussing plea rates and accuracy concerns in misdemeanor adjudication). While concerns
about discretion and accuracy are vast and acute in the misdemeanor adjudication, and
while quasi-inquisitorialism might provide some inroads in that distinctive context, see
infra Part III, the bulk of the discussion in this Article has felony cases in mind.
68 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2009 STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 12; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2006 STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 10.
69 Compare Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that plea bargaining “presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively
compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser
offense”), with Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (positing
impressive error rate in criminal convictions of 0.027%).
70 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2468 (2004) (observing that plea bargains are based not on goals of punishment but
“wealth, sex, age, education, intelligence, and confidence,” and that structural influences
skew bargains even more than trials); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1947–49, 1951, 1965–66 (1992) (discussing factors undermining accuracy of guilty pleas).
71 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 207 (1995) (discussing prosecutorial
bargaining incentives based on resource limitations).
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waivers of the right to post-conviction DNA testing are all widespread features
of standard plea agreements in the state and federal systems.72
Be that as it may, there is yet a third and quite important possibility,
which is that even given broad pretrial discretion as an embedded feature of
criminal procedure doctrine, and risky evidentiary inputs that trials currently
do not adequately vet, there exist adequate corrective mechanisms outside
criminal procedure doctrine to both better equip trial processes to sort out
bad evidentiary inputs, or directly correct flaws in pretrial practices. This
subconstitutional, and even extrajudicial space has been where much
(indeed, some of the most creative and important) recent scholarship attending to reliability concerns created by pretrial discretion has focused its attention. Many, for example, have called on judges to more consistently embrace
their discretion under state and federal rules of evidence to act as gatekeepers for not just scientific evidence (as the post-Daubert regime contemplates),
but other error-prone products of the investigative stage, including eyewitness testimony, confessions, and informants.73 Others have called for a focus
beyond the trial, to “new ways to ensure accuracy other than adversarial scrutiny and the incentives arising from trials and bargaining,” including expansion of pretrial discovery, direct improvements in the quality of investigation,
and “increasing the involvement of the judicial branch” in pretrial rather
than trial-centered activities.74 Adoption of reliability-enhancing procedures
for investigators; institutional arrangements such as blinding, more segmented case staffing, or greater supervisory or prosecutorial review of police
investigations; and prosecutorial rulemaking to create checks on charging,
discovery, and plea bargaining have all been advanced.75
72 See, e.g., King, supra note 8, at 648–50 (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel
waivers); Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (showing in a study of 1000 randomly selected plea
agreements found that nearly two-thirds contained waivers of defendants’ rights to
appeal); Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 580–81 (2013)
(discussing empirical research documenting presence of Brady, DNA, and post-conviction
waivers in federal plea agreements); Wiseman, supra note 8, at 989 (discussing DNA waivers in federal and state courts); Turner, supra note 17, at 221–22; see also Memorandum
from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors, Guidance Regarding Use of
DNA Waivers in Plea Agreements (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/
ag-memo-dna-waivers111810.pdf (erecting presumption against but not banning DNA
waivers).
73 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 339 (2012) (reviewing proposals).
74 Brown, supra note 13, at 1591 (emphasis added).
75 See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 6, at 247–60 (discussing various reforms in light of
numerous exonerations); SIMON, supra note 6, at 45–49 (suggesting possible reforms to
police investigations); Barkow, supra note 22, at 878; Bibas, supra note 70, at 2542–43 (suggesting that judges take a larger role in plea bargaining); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea
Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure,
33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 295–97 (2006) (discussing a number of possible reforms to the
prosecutor against a backdrop of inquisitorial comparison); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller,
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But while these calls have been heeded in some quarters, the best examples of reform approaches remain largely features of outlier practices. The
recording of interrogations is increasingly a part of law enforcement practice,
though due largely not to judicial or legislative mandate but rather individual
adoption by law enforcement agencies.76 Even so, persistent opposition
remains, and as Richard Leo and others have argued, recording does not
diminish the importance of the (dramatically less popular) need for interrogation practices to change in the first instance.77 A small number of jurisdictions have been leaders in reforming approaches to eyewitness identification,
both through required investigative procedures that comport with best practices from the social science research,78 and through greater courtroom scrutiny via, for example, jury instructions that specifically educate jurors on the
reasons for eyewitness error.79 And yet, many more jurisdictions remain
without such reforms.80 Expanded discovery and access to evidence has been
dramatic in certain limited areas—specifically, post-conviction access to biological evidence.81 But aside from a small number of jurisdictions that have
moved to open or nearly open file discovery, pretrial, and especially pre-plea
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 48–50 (2002) (suggesting reforms to
the screening process used by prosecutors).
76 See HARRIS, supra note 62; Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1127 (2005) (“In the past few
years, the many benefits of complete audio or video recording of custodial interviews have
become increasingly apparent to all parties.”).
77 See LEO, supra note 6, at 296 (encouraging recording of confessions but conceding
that “most police departments still do not” do so, including the FBI and several major
urban departments).
78 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52 (2014) (outlining the procedures used for a
photo lineup); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 38.20 (West 2014) (noting that policies
adopted by law enforcement on photo lineups must take into account research on eyewitness identification); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 695 (Or. 2012) (en banc) (noting that
eyewitness identification can be questionable); John J. Farmer, N.J. Att’y Gen., to All Cty.
Prosecutors, Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live
Lineup Identification Procedures (Apr. 18, 2001), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/ag
guide/photoid.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
79 See, e.g., State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 717 (Conn. 2012) (noting that the defendant
wanted to provide an expert witness on the shortcomings of eyewitness identification);
State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1036 (Haw. 2012) (noting that one way courts mitigate
the potential inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony is through jury instructions); State v.
Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 928 (N.J. 2011) (noting the importance of scientific-based jury
instructions on eyewitness identification).
80 POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2013), available at http://www.fd.org/
docs/training-materials/2013/MT2013/Eyewitness_ID.pdf. Federal courts have been particularly resistant to change. See, e.g., United States v. Luis, 835 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1987)
(refusing to require jury charges for eyewitness testimony); Thompson, supra note 73, at
356.
81 See Access to Post-conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/304.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (documenting access to forensic
evidence for post-conviction DNA testing in all fifty states).
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access to evidence remains limited and apparently largely governed by the
discretion of individual offices or prosecutors.82 Greater prosecutorial
rulemaking, both internally and as a prompt for changes in police practices,
has been identified as a promising reform, but there is little evidence that it
has garnered mainstream adoption.83 A small number of states have moved
to insert judges more directly into pretrial processes, for example via requirements for court-supervised pretrial and pre-plea disclosure, or judicial monitoring of pleas.84 But again, this is a minority shift; far more courts and
rulemakers have declined to go down the plea oversight road.85
B.

Beefing Up the Standard Account

Returning for the time being to the realm of court-driven oversight,
what accounts for the stark and persistent divide in criminal procedure doctrine between the judicial scrutiny that attends pretrial and trial-focused activities? A prevalent (though certainly not exclusive) explanation from
observers of doctrine in this area has been to use the Court’s phrase “our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal
justice.”86 Roughly speaking, that preference is understood to root constitutional criminal procedure protections exclusively in the institution of the
adversary trial, and more broadly to reject Founding-era features of Continental European criminal process in favor of the common law trial procedures associated primarily with England.87
In part, the accusatory-inquisitorial distinction functions as an interpretative touchstone for divining the meaning of key constitutional criminal protections that by their terms pertain to initiation of a “criminal case” and
82 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64
MERCER L. REV. 639, 670–71 (2013) (noting that expanded federal attention to discovery
compliance has been tethered to constitutional standards and not broader norms); Janet
Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 1329, 1373 (2012) (noting that the procedure of open-file discovery is rare).
83 See Wright & Miller, supra note 75.
84 ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.8, 17.4; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172; IDAHO CRIM. R. 11; ILL. S. CT. R.
402(d); N.J. S. CT. R. 3.9-1; State v. Warner, 762 So. 2d 507, 513 (Fla. 2000); People v.
Fontaine, 268 N.E.2d 644, 644 (N.Y. 1971); Medlin v. State, 280 S.E.2d 648, 648 (S.C.
1981); State v. Wakefield, 925 P.2d 183, 187 (Wash. 1996) (en banc).
85 See Brown, supra note 13, at 1634; King, supra note 8, at 671 (discussing non-constitutional options for restricting waiver but finding little adoption to date); Turner, supra
note 17, at 202–04, 212–13; Wiseman, supra note 8, at 968 (discussing the small number of
states enacting legislation to preclude waiver of DNA testing).
86 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
87 It bears noting, however, that two central features of American accusatory criminal
justice—the centrality of defense counsel, and the figure of the public prosecutor as the
state’s representative in litigation—were deliberate departures from the English common
law at the time of the Founding, and indeed in the case of the latter represents adoption of
a feature of Continental institutions. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 308 (1973);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60–66 (1932).
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conduct at “trial.”88 Thus, the Framers’ putative distaste for Continental
adjudication based upon confessions and other evidence procured in secret
and through coercive means provides a historically inflected interpretative
touchstone for the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment counsel, jury, and confrontation rights.
Exemplary is the Court’s account in the nineteenth-century decision Brown v.
Walker of the historical roots of the self-incrimination prohibition:
The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest
against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating
accused persons . . . . So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system
impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the
States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused
person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.89

Similar is the Court’s recent account of the Confrontation Clause as
drafted to reflect the Founders’ understanding of the English common law as
guaranteeing “live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing” in contrast to Continental systems’ condoning of “examination in private by judicial
officers,” as well as their outrage at notorious examples of England’s departure from common law guarantees in, among other instances, the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh.90
But if conceptions of adversarial justice operate as a rule of constitutional inclusion, so too do they delineate exclusion from the ambit of oversight. The modern Court has assiduously policed the line between where the
Constitution guarantees adversarial scrutiny and where it does not, a fact of
significant consequence for oversight of pretrial activities.91 To be sure, early
decisions occasionally blurred this line, as when the Court in Boyd v. United
88 U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
89 161 U.S. 591, 596–97 (1896); see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)
(stating that the Fifth Amendment exclusionary mandate is premised on the notion that
“ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system—a system in which the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion
prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth”); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
54 (1949) (plurality opinion) (“Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial
system. Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice since it freed
itself from practices borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent whereby an
accused was interrogated in secret for hours on end.”); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
237 (1940) (“The determination to preserve an accused’s right to procedural due process
sprang in large part from knowledge of the historical truth that the rights and liberties of
people accused of crime could not be safely entrusted to secret inquisitorial processes.”).
90 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (“Our Constitution and the common-law traditions it
entrenches . . . do not admit the contention that facts are better discovered by judicial
inquisition than by adversarial testing before a jury.”).
91 Cf. Van Kessel, supra note 29, at 493–95 (making a similar point with regard to trial,
rather than pretrial, procedures).
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States characterized the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as enjoying an “intimate relation” and “run[ning] almost into each other” such that
compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of
goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness
against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure—and an unreasonable
search and seizure—within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.92

But that sentiment has been abandoned with the rise of a starker accusatoryinquisitorial distinction. Thus, in Andresen v. Maryland, the Court backtracked from Boyd and held that the Fifth Amendment did not per se forbid
the state from seizing business records or admitting them against the authoring defendant at trial: nothing about such a seizure compelled the statements
made by the defendant in the records, and compulsion to assist police in
evidence gathering was beyond the purview of Fifth Amendment concerns.93
In a similar manner, the Court has rejected interpretations of the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment that would
require fuller discovery in the pretrial realm in order to fully effectuate the
aims of trial testimony and cross-examination. Thus, in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, the Court explained that interpreting the Confrontation Clause to
require discovery of otherwise privileged records that could impeach prosecution witnesses would expand the clause beyond its function of preserving
“wide latitude at trial to question witnesses,” in the limited space of trial.94
By the time of McNeil v. Wisconsin, a majority of the Court actually
embraced what it called an inquisitorial characterization of American criminal
justice in the pretrial realm:
What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the presence
of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal
investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments
pro and con adduced by the parties. . . . Our system of justice is, and has
always been, an inquisitorial one at the investigatory stage . . . .95

As a sphere of criminal justice processes that was beyond the core concern of adversarial procedural protections, it was only natural that in regard
to pretrial activities “legalistic” norms of assuring reliable evidence in the trial
sphere would be unwelcome—a premise that Brinegar introduced by way of a
stark adversary/non-adversary divide, and that Illinois v. Gates drew upon in
insisting that “flexible” and non-legalistic evaluations were requirements in
substantive judicial review of pretrial evidence gathering.96
92 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633–35 (1886).
93 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476–77 (1976); see Montejo v. Louisiana, 556
U.S. 778, 796–97 (2009); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 456–58 (1994); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
94 480 U.S. 39, 52–53 (1987); see also id. at 56 (rejecting a similar argument regarding
the Compulsory Process Clause).
95 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).
96 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983) (“Perhaps the central teaching of
our decisions bearing on the probable-cause standard is that it is a ‘practical, nontechnical

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL208.txt

804

unknown

Seq: 22

notre dame law review

8-JAN-15

14:44

[vol. 90:2

Beyond the boundaries of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, provisions
where historical anti-inquisitorial roots can plausibly be identified, the adversarial-inquisitorial contrast has still served broadly as a justificatory narrative.
The Court has repeatedly rejected constructions of constitutional criminal
rights that enshrine practices deemed more consistent with (a particular conception of) a system of adjudication that is quite truly foreign to our own
adversarial one. An example of such practices are mechanisms of freestanding disclosure obligations on the state that would eschew party-driven case
development. Thus, when the Court announced in United States v. Bagley that
prosecutors had an affirmative constitutional duty to disclose favorable evidence, independent of any request from opposing counsel, it recognized that
this was a “departure from a pure adversary model” of adjudication—a limited one, lest the Court “ ‘entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice’ ”97—read, “our adversary system.” Notably,
when the Court considered (and rejected) in United States v. Ruiz the notion
that due process required disclosure of favorable evidence prior to trial, the
briefs debated the extent of Bagley’s departure from the adversary system,
with the government successfully characterizing a constitutional pretrial disclosure obligation as “fundamentally alter[ing] . . . the adversary system.”98
Similarly, the Court in recent times has repeatedly rejected the suggestion that due process of law entails a guarantee that pretrial procedures will
produce reliable evidence or accurate outcomes, based upon constraints on
the judicial role dictated by the adversary system. In regard to confessions in
Colorado v. Connelly, jailhouse snitches in Kansas v. Ventris, and eyewitness
identification in Perry v. New Hampshire, the Court has repeatedly rejected the
suggestion (advanced by state supreme courts in two of the three instances)
that the guarantee of due process contemplated rigorous judicial gatekeeping of the evidence gathered in investigation, absent affirmative allegations
of deliberate police misconduct. In each instance, the Court affirmed that in
“our” system, substantive accuracy is committed to the jury function mediated
by the common law of evidence, while due process protects only against the

conception.’” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))); Brinegar, 338
U.S. at 174 (“Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by
evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some
extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system . . . . [However,]
[t]hose standards have seldom been so applied [in evaluating arrests].”).
97 473 U.S. 667, 675 nn.6–7 (1985) (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117
(1967)).
98 Reply Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002)
(No. 01-595); see also Brief for Respondent at 12, Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (No. 01-595) (arguing
that Bagley modified the adversary system); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)
(“[T]he Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the
parties must be afforded . . . it does speak to the balance of forces between the accused and
his accuser.”).
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state gaining an “unfair advantage” in adversary adjudication.99 Thus, as with
Brady doctrine, the premise is that constitutional criminal procedure guarantees only that courts maintain the level of the playing field for the adversary
process—and no more.
Also rooted, at least in part, in “our” accusatory system has been the
Court’s posture toward scrutiny of plea bargaining: a reluctance rooted in
the adversarial ideals of a limited judicial role, and the interrelated values of
party control and prosecutorial discretion.100 No doubt, when viewed from
the standpoint of its procedural characteristics, plea bargaining is the antithesis of accusatory justice, lacking as it does any of the trappings of adversarial
contest and epitomizing conviction by confession.101 But viewed from the
standpoint of what Mirjan Damas̆ka might refer to as the liberalist cultural
underpinnings of our accusatory system, plea bargaining is (at least in theory) the full flowering of adversarial values. As characterized by Gerard
Lynch, “[T]he adversarial notion that the parties stand as equal autonomous
disputants before the court, and that the court is not an independent engine
for state administration of justice, but rather an arbitrator of such disputes as
parties choose to bring before it.”102
These values have led the Court to reject a range of postulated roles for
judges’ supervision or freestanding error correction in the plea bargaining
context.103 Thus, in Brady v. United States, in which the defendant argued
99 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012); Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S.
586, 594 n.* (2009); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
100 It remains to be seen whether the recent decisions in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376
(2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), represent exceptions to the rule or the
proverbial camel’s nose.
101 Compare North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (requiring “factual basis”
for plea), with Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322–24 (1999) (describing plea
colloquy as amounting more to a negotiated stipulation than adversarial confrontation).
102 Lynch, supra note 23, at 2120–21 (noting as well, however, that in practice plea
bargaining “actually looks, to most defendants, far more like what American lawyers would
call an inquisitorial system than like the idealized model of adversary justice described in
the textbooks”); see also Mirjan Damas̆ka, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 535–36 (1975); Langer, supra note 75, at 247. This point is
resonant with the voluminous literature assessing the Court’s contract-based frame for
understanding plea bargaining. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 70. Significantly, plea
bargaining is, if present at all, a comparably minor feature of most Continental criminal
law systems, reflecting (along with other rules limiting prosecutors’ charging discretion)
the inquisitorial sensibility that “the state may not abandon its obligation to guarantee that
the law on the books is enforced and that the facts support the charge.” Goldstein, supra
note 19, at 1019; see also Turner, supra note 17, at 214–17.
103 See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008); Castro v. United
States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
181 n.2 (1991) (“What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is not the presence of counsel, much less the presence of counsel where the defendant has not requested
it; but rather, the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the
factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”); Van Kessel, supra note 29, at 491–92 (“[T]o
the extent the Court’s dicta constitutionalizes the process of ‘adversary testing,’ it erects
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that the threat of the death penalty rendered his guilty plea to a charge carrying a term of years involuntary, the Court held that judicial assessment of
substantive coercion should not undo the “mutual[ ] . . . advantage” that
presumptively flows from plea bargains negotiated by competent counsel and
assented to by duly advised defendants.104 In Mezzanatto, the value of “party
control . . . consonant with the background presumption of waivability”
eclipsed even congressional judgment when the Court upheld agreements to
waive the inadmissibility of a defendant’s statements in negotiations,
enshrined by the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure for the
very purpose of preserving the overall market for pleas.105 On the flip side,
federal courts governed by the procedural dictates of Rule 11 as well as a
majority of state courts routinely reject as involuntary pleas that bear the
imprimatur of judicial involvement in the bargaining process—a role
thought by many commenters to be at times conducive rather than antithetical to accurate and just outcomes; such conduct, even if not outright unconstitutional, contravenes “[t]he judge’s role . . . [as] that of a neutral arbiter of
the criminal prosecution.”106
The account that emerges is of a system of criminal procedure made
both coherent and legitimate by adherence to core features of “our” accusatory system: the requirements of orality and face-to-face confrontation of witnesses;107 conviction on the basis of a contest of narratives developed
through adversaries’ independent investigative and advocacy efforts;108 the
role of the judge as a neutral arbiter and the centrality of the jury as
substantial constitutional barriers against assigning to judges the powers traditionally held
by lawyers in the adversary system.”).
104 397 U.S. 742, 752, 758 (1970); see also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809
(1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing “give-and-take negotiation common in plea
bargaining between the prosecution and defense, which arguably possess relatively equal
bargaining power”).
105 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 206 (1995) (invoking party control that is
consonant with the background presumption of waivability).
106 United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 557 (9th Cir. 1992); see FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(c)(1); United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460–61 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing concern with protecting judge as “neutral arbiter”); United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 202
(2d Cir. 1976); State v. Williams, 666 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); cf. Brief for
Respondent at 35–37, United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013) (No. 12-167) (characterizing judicial “exhortation” of plea acceptance in inquisitorial terms). Several states,
however, have fashioned regimes of judicial involvement, either in plea negotiation or in
substantive review of a plea deal following bargaining. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-1021(a) (West 2013) (“The trial judge may participate in [plea] discussions.”); VT. R.
CRIM. P. 11; Turner, supra note 17 (discussing Connecticut and Florida). The Supreme
Court affirmed last term that any outright ban on judicial involvement, as reflected in the
federal rules, is “prophylactic” rather than “impelled by the Due Process Clause or any
other constitutional requirement.” Davila, 133 S. Ct. at 2142.
107 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534 (1961).
108 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408–09 (1988); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54
(1949) (plurality opinion).
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factfinder;109 and more fundamentally, an expressed commitment to individual autonomy over truth-finding and, relatedly, bureaucratic expertise.110
Inquisitorial systems serve as a structural “contrast model,” a foil for understanding appropriate doctrinal and institutional arrangements in “our” system of criminal justice.111 In the Court’s account, embracing accusatory
justice necessarily entails rejecting inquisitorial institutions and approaches.
Conversely, rejecting inquisitorial institutions and approaches legitimates
adversarialism.112 Hence, as David Sklansky has explained, the orientation is
not simply pro-adversarialist, but at least as importantly is an “anti-inquisitorial” stance.113
And herein lies the rub for efforts to map a different, more searching
approach to legal oversight of pretrial activities. Scholars have unquestionably been more critical than the Court in their attitudes toward “our adversary
system.” Much of what commentators think would usefully fill the pretrial
vacuum is in fact more resonant with, indeed often expressly inspired by,
Continental legal systems. Strategies to expand defense access to evidence in
the pretrial stage through greater openness in police and prosecutorial files,
or to depoliticize and enhance the professionalism of police and prosecutor
offices through rulemaking and expansion of bureaucratic checks, would certainly bring United States practices more in line with—though certainly not
replicate—a European model of investigative practices.114 So too would proposals to insert judges into substantive evaluation of charge or sentence bargaining that occurs in the course of guilty plea negotiation, as such practices
would move away from the ideal of autonomous, party-driven control and the
judge as umpire, and toward a conception of the judge as independently
enforcing the state’s commitment to accuracy.115
Moreover, these proposals are frequently accompanied by the concession that, at least as a positive matter, greater scrutiny of pretrial practices is
in tension with our putative adversarial preferences, and hence faces signifi109 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 312 (2004); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
110 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (“One can certainly argue that [efficiency or fairness]
would be better served by leaving justice entirely in the hands of professionals; many
nations of the world, particularly those following civil-law traditions, take just that course.
There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers’ paradigm for criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury.”).
111 See Sklansky, supra note 21.
112 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690–92 (1993); United States v. Williams, 504
U.S. 36, 41 (1992); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181–82 (1991); Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984) (“Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda
requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.”).
113 See Sklansky, supra note 21.
114 See Findley, supra note 22, at 900–01; Langer, supra note 75, at 253–55; Luna &
Wade, supra note 17, at 1431–32.
115 See Langer, supra note 75, at 263–65; Luna & Wade, supra note 17, at 1431–32.
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cant doctrinal, cultural, and political barriers to adoption.116 However, it
bears emphasizing that the crux of the tension is not so much “our” adversarial system itself, but rather in the dichotomous imperative of the contrast
model.117 In other words, it is the Court’s apparent commitment to barring
any degree of inquisitorial incursion that is consequential here, especially in
limiting hospitability to modified concessions to inquisitorial borrowing.
Exemplary is the Court’s rejection of doctrinal inroads to expand judicial
gatekeeping of eyewitness or confession evidence in Connelly, Ventris, and
Perry, rooted in commitments foundational to “our” system of justice that
juries are competent to hear and vet such evidence.118 The discovery cases
discussed above betray the exceptions that prove this rule; the Court has jealously guarded the limited encroachment on party-controlled litigation that
Brady’s affirmative prosecutorial obligation creates, repeatedly affirming that
the obligation is no greater than the minimum required to equalize adversarial imbalance at (the adversary) trial.119 The upshot is that pursuant to
the Court’s anti-inquisitorial paradigm, both coherence and legitimacy (we
are told) require vigilance against such practices.
It is worthwhile on this score to make what is perhaps an obvious point.
There is no principled reason—and the Court never clearly offers one—why
some increment of softening adversarial commitments, especially in the interest of enhancing accuracy (unquestionably at least one goal of our system of
adjudication), cannot be tolerated. It is not our adversary system itself, but
the nature of the Court’s anti-inquisitorialism, that explains the lack of traction for any such proposals—even in an era when the reliability of our criminal justice system, and in particular pretrial processes, is increasingly subject
to question.
C.

The Standard Account Is Incomplete

Anti-inquisitorialism is undoubtedly an important conceptual and rhetorical commitment in the Court’s criminal procedure doctrine, and, as the
previous Section elaborated, it offers at least a partial explanation for the
Court’s seeming deafness to the increasingly high-pitched indictment of the
116 See, e.g., LEO, supra note 6; Darryl K. Brown, American Prosecutors’ Powers and Obligations in the Era of Plea Bargaining, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 24, at 200, 202 (explaining that “[t]he paucity of affirmative prosecutorial obligations
can be explained by the traditional presumption that an adversarial trial is the mode of
disposition for criminal charges”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 1589, 1593
(2006).
117 Professor Sklansky himself notes but does not emphasize the relevance of his
account for criminal procedure doctrine, or the absence thereof, concerning pretrial activities. See Sklansky, supra note 21, at 1641–42.
118 See supra text accompanying note 99.
119 See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786 (1972); see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (noting limited obligation);
Brief for Petitioner, Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (arguing that the obligation to preserve fruits
of investigation was inconsistent with adversary system).
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discretion given over to pretrial activities. Nevertheless, the explanation is
both descriptively incomplete and normatively unsatisfying. The subsequent
Part will make the descriptive case. It is worth pausing here to develop the
normative point: What is the value of looking for an additional accounting of
the Court’s jurisprudential preferences? Putting to the side the intrinsic
value of (what this Article contends is) a more complete understanding of
doctrine in this area, there are at least three additional reasons to give fuller
consideration to an internal view of the Court’s work.
The first relates to what some might view as a quaint respect for the
importance of the Court’s jurisprudence. Scholarship aiming to remind us
that constitutional criminal procedure is not the only or best game in town
from the standpoint of improving criminal justice outcomes is essential and
well-taken. But for better or for worse, the Court’s criminal procedure doctrine remains a touchstone of our collective understanding of how, if at all,
the Constitution constrains government in administering criminal justice.
The lone centrality of anti-inquisitorialism leaves the Court vulnerable to a
charge of total and complete deafness to the challenges that have been posed
to the reliability of the criminal justice system—not simply in the academic
literature, but in litigation and amicus practice before the Court over the last
decade. Relatedly, it also leaves us lacking understanding of how, if at all, the
Court has adapted to those challenges while still holding to the adversarial
line. The account that follows aims to dispel the first notion by developing
the second point—the dynamic of adaptation.
There is a second and even more practical cash-out. As Section I.A discussed, many have recognized that the odds of a fundamental shift in constitutional doctrine are slim, that the Supreme Court or even lower courts are
inhospitable environments for the reliability-focused arguments of the day,
and that those with aspirations to diminish pretrial discretion and enhance
accuracy are best advised to take the route of direct institutional reform—
prompted either by legislation or from within.120 But in abandoning the
Court’s doctrinal ship for the putatively more serviceable vessels of state
courts and legislatures, scholars and reformers may not have sufficiently grappled with the influence of anti-inquisitorialism as both a sometime-dictate of
constitutional interpretation121 and a more pervasive legal-cultural benchmark.122 Lower courts have widely taken the Court’s anti-inquisitorial com120 See Findley, supra note 22, at 951–54.
121 Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1086–95 (2009) (arguing that the logical structure of Supreme Court
argumentation is influential in lower courts).
122 See LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 343 (asserting that adversarial infatuation “had the
effect of perpetuating the central blunder of the inherited system: the failure to develop
institutions and procedures of criminal investigation and trial that would be responsible
for and capable of seeking the truth”); SIMON, supra note 6, at 214 (characterizing accusatorial rhetoric as “a form of legal nationalism”); Damas̆ka, supra note 19, at 554–87; Goldstein, supra note 19, at 1016–19 (discussing connections between theoretical and technical
facets of accusatorial criminal procedure); Luna & Wade, supra note 17, at 1505–06; Wil-
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mitments to militate rejection of more far-reaching pretrial oversight.123
And even in the political sphere, particularly in the context of debates surrounding the appropriate boundaries of American prosecutorial discretion,
there is evidence that the lack of any competitor to the standard account of
“our” adversary system’s dictates creates an impediment to the more farreaching types of approaches discussed above.124 An important sentiment
animating this Article, then, is that if there are more nuanced aspects of the
Court’s commitment to adversarialism, it is well to recover them in part to
supply other actors and decisionmakers with plausible alternative narratives
that are nevertheless rooted in the Court’s influential depiction of “our”
criminal justice system.
Finally, there is an important unmasking function to the account that
follows. As will be revealed, the Court has conceptualized the pretrial realm
as one that, though relatively free from judicial oversight, bears sufficient
intrinsic, self-executing guarantees of reliability that a light formal regulatory
touch does not raise serious accuracy concerns. For reasons already
described and that will be developed more in Part II, there is reason to be
skeptical, even cynical, of the factual justification for that depiction. But only
in bringing the construct of pretrial regularity to light can one begin to call
liam T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1355–62 (1993).
123 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L.
REV. 323, 339 (2011) (observing that “most state courts continued to apply their own constitutional provisions in lockstep with federal analogues”). In this regard, it is worth
observing that New Jersey and Alaska are the two states typically identified as occupying the
leading edge of reform in regard to pretrial oversight—in particular a more direct role for
the judiciary. Those states are also atypical in maintaining a far more hierarchical criminal
justice bureaucracy than is the norm in the adversary approach, including strong norms of
top-down prosecutorial leadership and supervision of police work, and supervisory action
by the state supreme courts. That the greatest inroads have come in states that have gone
in for a pound if for a penny is telling. See Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and
Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2064–65 (2006) (commenting on “outlier” features
of New Jersey and Alaska).
124 See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 149–50 (1974) (testimony of Richard Thornburgh, U.S. Att’y, W.D. Pa) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments Hearing]; Brief of Amicus Curiae National District Attorneys Association in Support of
Respondent, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145) [hereinafter Smith Brief of
National District Attorneys Association]; Proposed Changes to RPC 3.8, WASH.COURTS, http:/
/www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.proposedRuleDisplayArchive&ruleId=
251 (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (“A concern has been raised that suggested subsection (h)
to RPC 3.8(h) is contrary to the adversary system of justice and fundamentally changes
substantive law regarding the prosecutor’s role.”); Letter from Emmett G. Sullivan, U.S.
Dist. Judge, to Richard C. Tallman, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of
Criminal Procedure Chair (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/CR%20Suggestions%202009/09-CR-A-Suggestion-Sullivan.pdf
[hereinafter Letter from Emmett G. Sullivan]; see also Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873, 875–81 (2012); Pizzi, supra note 122, at
1355–62.
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the Court’s bluff and attempt to hold the doctrine and the regulated parties
to the standard putatively erected for them.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT’S QUASI-INQUISITORIALISM

This Part begins by reexamining the Court’s conception of police pretrial activities, especially evidence-gathering and arrest-making, that were discussed in Part I as framed by the anti-inquisitorial account. Returning first to
Fourth Amendment doctrine, the discussion reveals that while the Court
delineated a kind of negative space in which more interventionist constitutional protections tethered to the accusatory sphere had no traction, it also
depicted that space as one in which police and prosecutors are restrained by
bureaucratic accountability, professionalism, and expertise that serve to legitimate the lack of judicial oversight. The account then continues to identify
these same attributes in decisions regarding police work outside the narrow
confines of search and seizure—indeed, to varying degree but with nonetheless consistent repetition—throughout decisions concerning constitutional
scrutiny of pretrial activities such as eyewitness procedures, interrogation,
and evidence retention and access. The discussion then turns to the realm of
prosecutorial discretion, and identifies similar themes and attributes in the
Court’s characterization of the prosecutorial role in the context of substantial, in some instances near-total, judicial deference to pretrial prosecutorial
conduct. Significantly, these qualities that the Court attributes to investigators and prosecutors are more resonant with institutional and professional
attributes of Continental, inquisitorial systems of criminal justice than the
traditional conception of the American system. They are also, for that reason, consonant with many of the types of reforms urged by those who criticize our adversarial system’s privileging of pretrial discretion over reliability.
In other words, while disclaiming a formal inquisitorial model, the Court
appears to be leveraging a depiction of on-the-ground pretrial practice that
offers, albeit informally, some of the accuracy-enhancing features that are
attributed to Continental systems.
Several clarifications are in order at the outset. None of what follows
should be taken to argue that the Court is self-consciously fashioning quasiinquisitorial legal norms. The account identifies narrative themes and trends
in what facts and circumstances clearly animate the Court’s decision making
with regard to pretrial doctrine—not (or at least not usually) decision rules
rooted in quasi-inquisitorial standards. But, although the Court consistently
declines invitations to constitutionalize such attributes—as, for example,
when it has rejected proposed Fourth Amendment reasonableness tests that
are tethered to police department policies125—it nevertheless frequently
highlights their presence in specific decisions, and, interestingly, signals the
significance of such attributes at oral argument.
125 See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
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Nor does this Part aim to argue that the Court’s positive account of
bureaucratic, professional, and expert restraint should be taken at face value.
Indeed, the discussion throughout will highlight ways in which the Court’s
reliance on putative quasi-inquisitorial characteristics is empirically thin or
even disinterested, and Section II.C will explore the extent to which marshaling the features of quasi-inquisitorialism has been largely opportunistic—
both on the part of the Court (particularly as it has aimed to create space for
diminishing judicial remediation of criminal procedure violations, and has
benefitted from cover in holding that line against the innocence/accuracy
assault) and the parties practicing before it. Nevertheless, not all deployments of the quasi-inquisitorial narrative have been cynical, and whatever the
mix of reasons for the narrative’s traction in the Court’s jurisprudence, its
presence there as a counterweight to a purer anti-inquisitorial account creates opportunities for recasting criminal justice norms—or so Part III will
argue.
A.
1.

Police in the Quasi-Inquisitorial Pretrial Sphere

Search and Seizure Sets the Stage

Recall that, outside the context of custodial interrogation and the (readily waivable) constraints of Miranda,126 police may operate relatively free
from judicial oversight in evidence gathering and evaluation. Significantly,
however, as the Court began to roll back the requirement of pretrial oversight by magistrates through the warrant-issuing process, it looked elsewhere
to identify constraints to ensure a baseline of fairness and reliability in police
work. What often filled the gap, according to the Court, were mechanisms of
bureaucratic and professional, rather than judicial, accountability—within
police hierarchy and, increasingly, through prosecutorial oversight. Each of
these qualities—bureaucratic checks on investigative work, notions of professionalism that internalize the pursuit of reliable investigative output, and
quasi-judicial supervision through the office of the prosecutor—is arguably
more resonant with features of inquisitorial systems (in their real and idealized forms) than the clash of competitive adversaries that is prototypical of
the accusatory model.127
a.

The Regulatory Police Bureaucracy

Beginning in the 1970s, the Court’s concession in Terry v. Ohio that
police could stop, question, and even (protectively) frisk individuals based on
a degree of suspicion short of probable cause128 emerged as the proverbial
126 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999).
127 See, e.g., Damas̆ka, supra note 102, at 507–08; Frase, supra note 23, at 555–64; John
H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and Reality, 87 YALE
L.J. 1549, 1555 (1978).
128 392 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1968).
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camel’s nose, enlarging the doctrinal tent for a range of scenarios where
Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” was met by police searches lacking a
warrant, probable cause, or even individualized suspicion. So long as a balance of “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree
to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty” tilted in the government’s favor, seizures
short of arrest, and the searches they entailed, would be permissible.129 Significantly, the Court first moved in this direction in the context of reviewing
random, warrantless vehicle stops conducted by Federal Border Patrol
agents—a law enforcement agency governed by both identifiable internal
policies as well as a federal statutory and regulatory regime. The Court’s
decisions, which grew progressively less legally restrictive of police, drew heavily on these extralegal agency guidelines, and a general expression of trust in
an emerging bureaucratic regulatory framework for police agencies, to set
the parameters for law enforcement discretion.130
When first confronted by such a challenge in United States v. BrignoniPonce, the Court rejected the authority of Border Patrol agents to stop vehicles in order to question occupants about their immigration status, where
such stops were made by “roving” agents unassigned to a “fixed” Border
Patrol checkpoint.131 While these stops were less intrusive than arrests, the
Court ruled that border agents would nevertheless be required to point to
“specific articulable facts” justifying stops—lest they enjoy limitless discretion
to detain residents as well as passers-through in the border region.132 Just a
year later, the Court held in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte that routine, suspicionless stops at fixed checkpoints passed Fourth Amendment muster.133
What made the difference to the Court? One account, given by the
majority in Delaware v. Prouse, is that the critical difference between MartinezFuerte and Brigoni-Ponce was that targets of stops were subjectively less
offended by fixed checkpoints rather than roving stops—a notion that Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in Prouse, mocked with some justification.134 But a
more coherent distinction, and one that the Court would later make explicit,
lay in the bureaucratic framework that necessarily attended the operation of
“fixed” checkpoints, and the absence of such internal constraint where
officers “roved” independently. Thus, Martinez-Fuerte’s analysis opens with a
129 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979).
130 See Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 14–17 (2003)
(discussing the emergence of police administrative rulemaking).
131 422 U.S. 873, 874, 884–85 (1975).
132 Id. at 884–85.
133 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
134 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Because
motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be ‘frightened’ or ‘annoyed’ when
stopped en masse, a highway patrolman needs neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop all motorists on a particular thoroughfare, but he cannot without articulable
suspicion stop less than all motorists. The Court thus elevates the adage ‘misery loves company’ to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
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lengthy description of the checkpoint’s physical and regulatory infrastructure—featuring large signs providing notice of its location, and a system by
which “ ‘point’ agent[s]” made initial stops and referred some vehicles for
secondary inspection.135 The opinion notes that the distinction between
fixed and roving patrols is one embodied in Border Patrol agency rules, and
that checkpoints are governed by a set of internally promulgated criteria—
aimed, critically, at assuring “effectiveness.”136 Moreover, the Court pointed
to demonstrated “effectiveness” of the Border Patrol’s operation, citing statistics on rates of finding undocumented individuals through secondary inspection.137 Fixed checkpoints worked a lesser “interference with individual
liberty,” within the meaning of the Court’s balancing test, but it was not solely
or even most importantly because of the experience of those stopped.
Rather, it was because of the extra-legally cabined discretion of those
stopping.138
As random vehicle interdiction became more widespread (fueled by a
shift to drug enforcement priorities), the Court’s jurisprudence migrated out
of the context of federal immigration enforcement and into the realm of
state and local law enforcement practice. But both the formal distinction
between roving and fixed stops, and the functional concern for the relative
degree of bureaucratic oversight that the two types of police interventions
enjoyed, remained a focus of the cases. Thus in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a random vehicle stop “for the purpose of
checking the driving license of the operator and the registration of the car,”
in the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.139
The second paragraph of the Court’s opinion depicts the stop as the random, discretionary act of a low-level patrol officer who “was not acting pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to document spot
checks, promulgated by either his department or the State Attorney General.”140 Analogizing such action to “roving” patrols, and applying the threepart test described above, the Court held that such a stop was unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.141 The state, according to
the Court, could point to no “safeguards” other than individualized suspicion
“to assure that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the discretion of the official in the field.’ ”142 Later that Term, the
Court’s notion of “safeguards” crystalized even further in the form of bureaucratic control; in Brown v. Texas, the Court, in rejecting the reasonableness of
another roving patrol officer’s car stop, distilled the principles of Prouse and
135 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546–47.
136 Id. at 553–54.
137 Id. at 554.
138 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975) (discussing discretion
in context of the liberty interference prong).
139 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650 (majority opinion).
140 Id. at 650–51.
141 Id. at 663.
142 Id. at 655 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
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Martinez-Fuerte to mean that “the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate
interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure
must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.”143
A decade later, the Court would reveal the endurance, though also the
substantive thinness, of its conception of bureaucratic substitutes for legal
scrutiny of police work. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court
reviewed, and reversed, a state court determination that random vehicle
stops at fixed, nonpermanent sobriety checkpoints on Michigan highways violated the Fourth Amendment.144 In the context of the above account of
Martinez-Fuerte, the opening paragraph of the Sitz opinion set the stage for a
clear outcome: it recounts that “the Michigan Department of State Police
and its director[ ] established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program in early
1986,” that the program was overseen by “a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory
Committee comprising representatives of the State Police force, local police
forces, state prosecutors, and the University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute,” and that “the advisory committee created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and
publicity.”145 On the other hand, the Court rejected the lower court’s evaluation of the checkpoints’ alleged ineffectiveness—pointing to a one percent
hit rate in finding intoxicated drivers—saying that absent indication that a
program of stops had “no empirical” merit, a state program of stops will enjoy
deference.146
b.

Professional and Organizational Expertise

In so stating, the Court in Sitz relied heavily on another, quasi-inquisitorial theme: the conception of law enforcement activities, particularly at the
operational rather than individual level, as rooted in professionally and organizationally imparted expertise.147 Thus, with regard to effectiveness review,
the Court declared:
Experts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of
apprehending drunken drivers is preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of
Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding
of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.148
143 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (emphasis added). Lower courts have taken
this cue. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 23, at 556 (“High-level police approval has . . . been
viewed by courts as a necessary component of a constitutionally valid drunk-driving roadblock.” (citing State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992 (Ariz. 1983))).
144 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
145 Id. at 447.
146 Id. at 453–54.
147 See Damas̆ka, supra note 102; Frase, supra note 23, at 556.
148 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453–54.
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Consider as well the Court’s more contemporary statement in its recent
decision on the use of drug-sniffing dog alerts in warrant applications. Permitting such use without resort to “inflexible” or “technic[al]” evaluation of
the dog’s reliability, and instead deferring to departments’ own choices in
certification or training regimes, the Court expressed confidence that “law
enforcement units have their own strong incentive to use effective training
and certification programs, because only accurate drug-detection dogs
enable officers to locate contraband without incurring unnecessary risks or
wasting limited time and resources.”149 These sentiments cast the police and
prosecutors who invented the Michigan sobriety checkpoint as law enforcement technocrats, knowledgeably and properly incentivized (more so than
courts) to pursue legitimate criminal problems through reasonable means.
It is well to point out that much of this is of a piece with the observation,
made by others, that the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions have tended
increasingly to elevate the venerable police “hunch” to the status of expertise.150 Indeed, even in Brignoni-Ponce and Brown, in which the Court
rejected the states’ suggestion that police could stop without articulating the
basis for their suspicion, the Court emphasized that an “articulable” basis
might arise from any number of factors, and that reviewing courts must consider that trained law enforcement agents may be “able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the
untrained observer.”151 But the exclusionary rule cases demonstrate that the
point here is somewhat different, highlighting not so much the Court’s deference to individual officers’ “commonsense” through learned “judgments and
inferences about human behavior,”152 but rather its conception of the law
enforcement profession as having developed and systematically inculcated
expertise beyond the ken of judiciary. If the individual officer is concededly
engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”153 the
organizational and professional vehicles for imbuing her with training and
expertise might still mitigate that bias.
In the Fourth Amendment context, this conception of professional and
organizational expertise and an organizational incentives structure that adequately internalizes accuracy values as a substitute for judicial scrutiny is
149 Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055–57 (2013).
150 See generally Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and the Fourth Amendment,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 226 (2012); L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1144–45 (2012).
151 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979); see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975).
152 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (preferring a process that “allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)
(noting that a reviewing court should “give due weight to inferences” drawn by law
enforcement because “a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise”).
153 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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nowhere more pervasive than in contemporary exclusionary rule jurisprudence. The notion surfaced in sporadic, if spirited, fashion, in the first two
decades of the life of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule,
adopted in United States v. Leon.154 Indeed, debates concerning the good
faith exception, as reflected in Leon itself, were heavily concerned with
whether the exclusionary remedy was necessary in order to bring about or
ensure professionalized, well-trained, well-incentivized police departments;
the Leon majority, however, was confident that an exception from exclusion
for “objective[ly] reasonable[ ]” police error would not undermine a regime
of “police training programs” that “are now viewed as an important aspect of
police professionalism.”155 In Hudson v. Michigan, the Court viewed police
training and discipline as sufficiently entrenched that entire Fourth Amendment rules—there the “knock-and-announce” rule—could be cleaved from
the remedial scheme with no consequence: “[M]odern police forces are
staffed with professionals; it is not credible to assert that internal discipline,
which can limit successful careers, will not have a deterrent effect.”156 But
Hudson was just the precursor to the Court’s incorporation of presumed
police professionalism into the contours of the exclusionary rule—and,
indeed, identifying its absence as a basis for relief. Thus, in Herring v. United
States, the Court announced, seemingly categorically, that the exclusionary
rule would be unavailable unless police officers were shown to act culpably in
violating the Fourth Amendment—unless, that is, “recurring or systemic negligence” on the part of a law enforcement organization could be shown.157
c.

The Prosecutor as Investigative Supervisor

A final, more recently emergent quasi-inquisitorial feature of the Court’s
search and seizure cases is worth noting: the Court’s conception of
prosecutorial review of police action as a discretion-checking mechanism.
Although prosecutors have long played some role in pre-charge investigation,
the investigative and prosecutorial functions in American criminal law have
traditionally (excepting again federal prosecutors) been conceived of as separate—indeed, sharply segregated.158 This is in contrast to many Continental
154 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
155 Id. at 919 n.20 (quoting Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the
Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1412 (1977)).
156 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006); see also United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741, 755 (1979) (suggesting that internal IRS regulations “may well provide more
valuable protection . . . than . . . the occasional exclusion of items of evidence in criminal
trials”).
157 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009); see also Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011)
(recognizing that the “acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms [plaintiff’s]
claim”).
158 Immunity doctrines in constitutional tort litigation, for example, premise the grant
of absolute immunity to prosecutors versus merely qualified immunity to police on the
conceptual distinction between prosecutorial and investigative functions. See Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); see also Damas̆ka, supra note 102 (explaining the “hierarchical” and “coordinate” models to illustrate features of Continental and Anglo-American
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systems, where prosecutors are, either formally or practically as a consequence of light magisterial oversight, monitors of police investigative
work.159
And yet the Court, particularly in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
has increasingly taken note of the oversight role sometimes played by prosecutors in criminal investigations—for example, in providing advice or even
authorization with regard to searches or warrant applications160—and has
even gone so far as to suggest that prosecutorial approval could insulate
police error from scrutiny. Thus, in Messerschmidt v. Millender, in which the
Court found that qualified immunity shielded an officer sued for swearing to
and executing an allegedly overbroad warrant, the Court pointed to review
and approval by both the officer’s supervisor and a prosecutor as “pertinent
in assessing whether they could have held a reasonable belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause.”161 In so holding, Messerschmidt signaled the Court’s approval of a position already staked out by several lower
courts.162 Indeed, while the Court’s decision in Burns v. Reed still governs the
question of whether prosecutors may enjoy absolute immunity for their conduct in participating in and advising police investigations (they do not),163 in
the recent case of Pottawattamie County v. McGhee the several states argued as
amicus, and at least three Justices exhibited sympathy to the view, that the
rule should be revisited in light of the benefits of prosecutorial involvement
including “efficient and productive” evidence gathering and avoiding “inadvertent” violations of suspects’ rights.164

criminal processes respectively); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003) (offering a normative model in which
prosecutors and agents monitor one another).
159 See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in
Three “Inquisitorial” Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 250–64 (1977);
Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 127, at 1555; Van Kessel, supra note 29, at 421–22.
160 See, e.g., Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 150 (2004) (suggesting police consultation with prosecutors supported reasonableness of actions); Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 818 n.1 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting police delay in obtaining warrant,
excused by Court, was explained not by magistrate unavailability but prosecutorial advice—
disclaimed by the Department of Justice in brief and at oral argument).
161 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1250 (2012).
162 See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Pappas, 592 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 198
(4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1258, 1264 (8th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999, 1005 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 872
(11th Cir. 1990).
163 500 U.S. 478 (1991).
164 Brief for the State of Colo. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
12–13, Pottawattamie Cnty. v. McGhee, 550 U.S. 1103 (2010) (No. 08-1065) (mem.); see
also Transcript of Oral Argument, McGhee, 550 U.S. 1103 (No. 08-1065), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_1065.
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The Pervasiveness of Quasi-Inquisitorialism

The Court’s increasingly express reliance on a putatively bureaucratically and professionally well-calibrated law enforcement profession to selfmonitor its legal discretion has not been limited to the search and seizure
context. Rather, and perhaps as a consequence of the Court’s preoccupation
with cabining exclusionary remedies, the Court’s harkening to internal
police discipline and rulemaking as an alternative mechanism of constraint
in the inquisitorial pretrial sphere has expanded beyond the Fourth Amendment context to other doctrinal areas implicated by evidence gathering and
evaluation.
In some such cases the Court has, as in Brigoni-Ponce and Brown, seemingly relied on record evidence that bureaucratic control and professionalism was systemically lacking in order to constrain police discretion through
constitutional doctrine. Exemplary is Missouri v. Seibert, in which the Court
held that the Fifth Amendment barred admission of Mirandized statements
made after an initial round of questioning in which Miranda warnings were
deliberately not given—the so-called “question-first” interrogation tactic.165
Apparently crucial to the Court’s determination that the fruits of that initial
unwarned interview must be suppressed was its extended discussion of the
extent to which “question-first” had become a feature of police training and
supervision, reflected in not only the individual interrogating officer’s training but also guidelines and model training promulgated by national and
state-level professional organizations such as the Police Law Institute.166
“The upshot,” Justice Souter wrote for the Court, was “a question-first practice of some popularity, as one can see from the reported cases describing its
use, sometimes in obedience to departmental policy.”167 That rebutting the
assumption of professionalism was a consequence of circumstance is further
highlighted by the result in United States v. Patane, decided the same day,
holding that the physical fruits of unwarned interrogations need not be suppressed consistent with the Fifth Amendment.168 Dissenting in that case was
Justice Souter, who expressed confusion over the disparate outcomes.169 A
plausible explanation for the votes of at least some of the Justices, such as
Justice Kennedy who concurred in Patane and Seibert, was the differing
records before the Court in relation to institutionalized legal flouting in the
form of police training and supervision.170
More often, however, as in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court’s
conception, or presumption, of bureaucratic and professional checks has
served to insulate police investigative activities. This has repeatedly been the
case in the context of the Court’s rejection of efforts to refashion the fair trial
165 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604, 611 (2004).
166 Id. at 605–06, 609–10 & n.2.
167 Id. at 611.
168 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004).
169 Id. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting).
170 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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guarantee of the Due Process Clause as a basis for more exacting evidentiary
scrutiny—as with eyewitness identification procedures and the use of informants. Perhaps most interestingly, in both of these arenas, as discussed
above,171 the Court’s reasoning has been strongly resonant with anti-inquisitorial themes, insisting that “safeguards built into our adversary system” are
adequate to the task of scrutinizing the evidentiary products of pretrial investigation.172 But alongside the Court’s conception of the appropriate structure of the trial space, and in particular proper adversarial limitations on the
judicial role in that space, has been a quasi-inquisitorial account of the conditions under which pretrial activities are occurring. Thus, in Manson v.
Brathwaite, the Court declined to fashion a per se rule of exclusion for identification evidence procured with suggestive procedures, and instead created a
harmless-error-style review of the overall reliability of an identification where
suggestion was employed, based in part on the Court’s confidence that “[t]he
interest in obtaining convictions of the guilty also urges the police to adopt
procedures that show the resulting identification to be accurate,” since
“[s]uggestive procedures often will vitiate the weight of the evidence at trial
and the jury may tend to discount such evidence.”173 In Kansas v. Ventris, in
which the Court held that a defendant’s pretrial statements to an informant
illegally placed in his cell could be admitted for impeachment purposes, the
Court also expressly rejected the invitation of amicus to “craft a broader
exclusionary rule for uncorroborated statements” of “jailhouse snitches”
based on the “inherent[ ] unreliabil[ity]” of such witnesses.174 The parties,
and in particular the United States as amicus at oral argument, had relied on
“increasing [police] professionalism” and “internal discipline,” as well as ethical rules governing prosecutors, in urging the Court not to bar the use of
such statements.175
But perhaps most exemplary are the Court’s cases concerning preservation of and access to evidence. In California v. Trombetta, the Court considered whether the Due Process Clause required not only that the state disclose
favorable evidence to the defense (as in Brady v. Maryland), but also that the
state take affirmative measures to preserve evidence whose exculpatory value
is yet unknown in order to ensure the defendant’s access to it down the
road.176 The evidence at issue in the case were breath samples of respondents, collected by an Intoxilyzer device in the course of a roadside test,
administered by police to determine intoxication.177 The device, however,
only recorded data from the samples and did not retain them; hence, by the
time of trial the defendant did not have access to the original specimen of
171 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
172 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (emphasis added).
173 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 n.12 (1977).
174 Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009).
175 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28, Ventris,
556 U.S. 586 (No. 07-1356); Brief for Petitioner at 27, Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (No. 07-1356).
176 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984).
177 Id. at 482–83.
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breath he blew into the device in order to perform independent analysis.178
The Court reversed the state court determination that due process required
preservation of the samples for use by defendants at trial, holding that “California’s policy” of destroying breath samples was not unconstitutional
because (under a Matthews v. Eldridge procedural due process balancing) the
exculpatory value of the evidence was low, and other means were available
for the defendants to impeach the Intoxilyzer results.179 Important to the
Court’s view that the value of the samples was minimal was the existence of a
detailed administrative scheme authorizing and prescribing procedures for
use, maintenance, and regular testing of Intoxilyzer devices, and the
scheme’s contemplation that breath samples would not be retained.180
Trombetta was susceptible of the interpretation that something equivalent
to the administrative scheme in place under California law was a necessary
substitute for constitutional scrutiny—a view taken by a number of lower
courts both before and following the decision.181 The Court, however, soon
disavowed any such implication. In Arizona v. Youngblood, the Court was
again faced with a defendant’s claimed denial of due process due to the loss
of forensic evidence prior to trial, but this time the record disclosed nothing
like Trombetta’s detailed scheme governing the reliability of the Intoxilyzer.182 Rather, a forensic analyst working with blood evidence in Youngblood’s prosecution for rape and murder had both failed to refrigerate or
freeze the evidence (in contravention of standard protocol in the field) and
had delayed testing it for fifteen months, such that the samples yielded
inconclusive results when ultimately tested for the presence of semen.183
Nevertheless, the Court, citing Trombetta, held that where police operate in
“good faith and in accord with their normal practice,” failure to preserve
potentially useful evidence, even negligently so, does not constitute a denial
of due process of law.184
In so holding, the Court moved away from Trombetta’s balancing of
apparent reliability as measured by bureaucratic assurances of accuracy
against the opportunity of the defense to impeach it, in favor of a bright-line
test considering only demonstrated official malice. It also established “nor178 Id.
179 Id. at 488–90.
180 Id. at 488, 489 & n.10.
181 See, e.g., Oshrin v. Coulter, 688 P.2d 1001, 1004–05 (Ariz. 1984) (distinguishing
Trombetta on basis of reliability of procedures attending forensic evidence collection); People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49, 52 (Colo. 1985) (“The state must employ regular procedures
to preserve evidence that a state agent, in performing his duties, could reasonably foresee
might be favorable to the accused.”); cf. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159–60 (Alaska
1985) (requiring standardized recording procedures to be in place to comply with state
constitutional due process guarantee).
182 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
183 State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 488 U.S. 51
(1988).
184 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56, 58 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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mal” police practice—however objectively unreasonable—as the threshold
for entitlement to deference. But it appeared to do so on the basis of the
Court’s view that police and prosecutors are presumptively rightly motivated
in their gathering and evaluation of evidence to competently assemble all
evidence that might support guilt. Disinclined to fashion a (more inquisitorially inspired) rule imposing an “undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain
and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution,” the Court deferred to “police themselves”
to “by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.”185 That Larry Youngblood was eventually exonerated
of his crime through enhanced DNA testing on the same degraded evidence
considered by the Court puts into stark relief the fallaciousness of the Court’s
judgment that “police themselves” are reliably entrusted with discerning the
probative value of physical evidence to a defendant’s guilt or innocence.186
Lower courts following Youngblood have consistently embraced this attitude of presumptive regularity in the work of police,187 though even while
citing Youngblood’s standard to deny due process claims for the destruction of
evidence, they frequently follow the example of Trombetta and ground
absence of bad faith in compliance with documented procedures for handling of evidence.188 Significantly, however, several state courts have
rejected Youngblood as a template for due process analysis under their own
state constitutions. These jurisdictions, in purporting to adopt a Trombetta
185 Id. at 58; see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 548 (2004) (denying respondent’s
due process claim in part on grounds that the police acted in good faith).
186 See Know the Cases: Larry Youngblood, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocencepro
ject.org/Content/Larry_Youngblood.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
187 See, e.g., Sadowski v. McCormick, 785 F. Supp. 1417, 1423 (D. Mont. 1992) (“At the
time the law enforcement officers made the decision not to gather numerous tools in the
proximity of the shooting, the state arguably had an interest in preserving the evidence for
purposes of fingerprinting and testing which was equally as compelling as Sadowski’s interest.”); Campa v. Erwin, No. C-1-03-550, 2005 WL 2313980, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2005)
(“[A]t the time the police failed to retain such evidence, they had at least as great an
interest in preserving it as petitioner, because it would have been useful to the
prosecutor . . . .”).
188 See, e.g., United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1991) (“FBI
procedure allows the release of such evidence back to an innocent party as soon as possible. The car was examined for eight to nine hours by two examiners, and twelve blood
samples and six bullet fragments were obtained. One hundred and fifty photographs were
taken of the car before it was released. It strains credulity to ascribe bad faith to the police
in this situation, as they would hardly have knowingly destroyed evidence that could have
placed the yet to be identified driver in the getaway car.”); see also United States v. Smith,
534 F.3d 1211, 1224 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Generally, destroying the evidence according to an
established government procedure ‘precludes a finding of bad faith absent other compelling evidence.’”); United States v. Beckstead, 500 F.3d 1154, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“Officers were acting pursuant to the department’s standard policy, and there is no evidence suggesting that they were otherwise acting in bad faith.”); Mitchell v. Goldsmith, 878
F.2d 319, 322 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that “the police followed departmental procedure” in
finding that “there was no bad faith on the part of the police”); State v. Bennett, 125 P.3d
522, 526–27 (Idaho 2005).
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balancing inquiry, have granted claims based on a lack of adequate administrative procedures to govern the regularity of evidence gathering and retention.189 As Part III will discuss, the access to evidence cases therefore serve as
an example of how clear emergence of a narrative competitor to antiinquisitorialism can facilitate departures from the baseline of pretrial discretion established by the Court.
B.

Prosecutors in a Quasi-Inquisitorial Space

This Section moves to the prosecutorial role prior to trial as depicted in
the Court’s decisions concerning the charging power and discovery. It
traces, again, conceptions of bureaucratic oversight and professional expertise that have been offered by the Court as gap-fillers in the spaces where
“our” adversary system has militated against judicial checks of prosecutorial
discretion in those spheres.
A caveat is in order at the outset. In drawing out similar quasi-inquisitorial themes in the Court’s account of both the police and prosecutorial role,
the Article should not be taken as suggesting that the Court’s jurisprudence
treats those two roles as substantially equivalent. As a matter of historical
tradition as well as constitutional text, broad prosecutorial discretion in core
activities such as charging has long been the American norm, whereas the
Fourth Amendment by its terms contemplates external review, through the
warrant process, of police evidence gathering.190 While warrant doctrine
and other mechanisms of external legal restraint on police may have diminished in recent decades,191 the view nevertheless remains that police—or at
least individual police officers—are fundamentally engaged in a singleminded and “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”192 and
must ordinarily account in some fashion to a more neutral party for their
enforcement actions.193 The American public prosecutor, by contrast, has
always been situated in an (uncomfortable) tug and pull between the partisan advocacy sphere of trial and impartial justice-seeking in the lofty tradition
189 See, e.g., Ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237, 1240–41 (Ala. 1992); Hammond v. State,
569 A.2d 81, 86–87 (Del. 1989) (preferring a balancing test that considers the bad faith,
importance of the missing material, and sufficiency of other evidence and noting “for
future guidance, the ‘agencies that create rules for evidence preservation should broadly
define discoverable evidence to include any material that could be favorable to the defendant’” (quoting Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 752 (Del. 1983))); People v. Newberry, 652
N.E.2d 288, 291 (Ill. 1995); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 506, 513–14 (W. Va. 1995);
see also Fisher, 540 U.S. at 549 n.* (Stevens, J., concurring) (identifying nine state courts
holding “as a matter of state constitutional law that the loss or destruction of evidence
critical to the defense does violate due process, even in the absence of bad faith”).
190 See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (“Our legal system has
traditionally accorded wide discretion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement
process . . . .”).
191 See supra Section II.A.
192 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
193 See, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2096 (2012) (observing that the “presumption of regularity” attending prosecutorial decisions does not extend to police).
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of Berger v. United States.194 Nevertheless, this Section suggests that there are
marked similarities in the manner in which the Court draws the limits of
police and prosecutorial discretion, and that those similarities cluster around
the attributes of quasi-inquisitorialism discussed above: bureaucratic regulatory checks, and professional and organizational norms and expertise that fill
the gap of judicial oversight in the pretrial realm.195 To be sure, these
themes may at times only be sketched in generalities; in the charging context, in particular, the Court has been clear that the presumption against
scrutiny of individual prosecutorial decisionmaking is so strong as to effectively preclude review absent fairly direct evidence of discriminatory animus.
And yet, even if hortatory, the gesture to presumed internal and external subjudicial constraint and expertise remains present. And at times, particularly
in the discovery context, the actual presence or absence of such conditions
emerges as more consequential.
1.

Prosecutorial Bureaucracy and Expertise at the Zenith of Deference:
Charging

It is a veritable truism that “[i]n our criminal justice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”196 Deference to
prosecutorial decisionmaking, always high, is at its zenith in the context of
the decision to charge.197 Where probable cause exists, prosecutorial selection of and among charges is virtually immune from scrutiny absent fairly
direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decisionmaking.198 Less
often probed are the justifications for this posture of deference. To be sure,
the Court itself has tended to let gesture to tradition fill in for rigorous reason-giving in this realm. Nevertheless, core features of the quasi-inquisitorial
narrative are present.
Consider first the Court’s own defense of broad prosecutorial discretion
to charge. Such deference, the Court has repeatedly said, rests on a constellation of factors: purported judicial inability to assess the criteria properly
affecting a decision to charge such as “strength of the case, the prosecution’s
194 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
195 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) (“Without disrespect to the
state law enforcement agent here involved, the whole point of the basic rule so well
expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson is that prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked
to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own investigations . . . .”); Mancusi
v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 371 (1968) (“[T]he subpoena involved here could not in any
event qualify as a valid search warrant under the Fourth Amendment, for it was issued by
the District Attorney himself, and thus omitted the indispensable condition that ‘the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint . . . be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486
(1958) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
196 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982)).
197 Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
198 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
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general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan”; and costs
including “chill[ing of] law enforcement” from opening prosecutorial decisionmaking to outside inquiry and revelation of “the Government’s enforcement policy.”199 Unquestionably, several values are reflected in this set of
concerns. Separation of powers is one, as the Court has frequently, more or
less explicitly, rooted its disinclination to second-guess prosecutorial decisions in its broader disinclination to question executive action.200 Another is
a concern for the volume and potentially chilling effect of litigation that
would be generated by opening charging decisions to legal scrutiny by discontents.201 But neither these nor other valid explanations of the concerns
animating charging deference accounts for the impact of that deference—
that is to say, the hits to fairness or reliability from removing charging from
the ambit of judicial review. What, for example, gave the Court confidence
in Hartman v. Moore to foreclose retaliatory prosecution claims based on particularized allegations that, despite probable cause to charge, “a prosecutor
was nothing but a rubber stamp for [vindictive] investigative staff or the
police,” on the ground that such circumstances are so “likely to be rare and
consequently poor guides in structuring a cause of action” that little was lost
by erecting a much higher per se rule of negating probable cause?202
The quasi-inquisitorial strains in the Court’s reasoning address those
concerns. Note the assumptions girding the widely cited litany of rationales
behind deference: that the government has developed “enforcement priorities” and an “overall enforcement plan” and “policy.”203 Any particular
charging decision is thus not only based on an individual prosecutor’s assessment of a case’s strength, but is made against a constraining backdrop of
higher-level bureaucratic decisionmaking. And in both case assessment and
priority setting, the Court views prosecutors—both high-level and line-level—
199 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607–08; see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (suggesting that “subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decision-making to outside inquiry” has the potential
to “chill law enforcement”); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n.11 (1982) (“[T]he validity of a
pretrial charging decision must be measured against the broad discretion held by the prosecutor to select the charges against an accused.”); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
248 (1980) (noting that the “wide discretion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement
process . . . ha[s] been found applicable to administrative prosecutors as well” (citation
omitted)); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor
has probable cause . . . the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to
file . . . generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).
200 See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263 (2006); Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
201 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607–08.
202 Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264; see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (noting that “the standard for proving [selective prosecution claims]
is particularly demanding, requiring a criminal defendant to introduce ‘clear evidence’
displacing the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully” (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S.
at 463–65)); Rumery, 480 U.S. at 397 (“[T]radition and experience justify our belief that
the great majority of prosecutors will be faithful to their duty.”).
203 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
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as guided by not only comparative expertise in the details of a particular case,
but also by standards of evaluation set for the prosecutorial profession—
including the ABA and state disciplinary authorities.
Thus, in United States v. Lovasco the Court erected a requirement of
demonstrated governmental bad faith for defendants asserting a due process
violation for prejudicial delay in prosecution, pointing to ABA prosecution
standards and Code of Professional Responsibility as sources of the “wide
range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government’s case” that
prosecutors must consider “in order to determine whether prosecution
would be in the public interest.”204 Or, as the Court put it in Cheney v. United
States District Court for the District of Columbia:
The decision to prosecute a criminal case, for example, is made by a publicly
accountable prosecutor subject to budgetary considerations and under an
ethical obligation, not only to win and zealously to advocate for his client but
also to serve the cause of justice. The rigors of the penal system are also
mitigated by the responsible exercise of prosecutorial discretion.205

Against this backdrop, it is fitting that in Heckler v. Chaney the Court
likened administrative agencies’ enforcement discretion to that extended to
criminal prosecutors.206
2.

Prosecutorial Bureaucracy and Expertise in the Tug and Pull of
Adversarial and Inquisitorial Models: Disclosure

While prosecutorial charging discretion features quasi-inquisitorial rhetoric with little substance, accounting for the Court’s posture in discovery doctrine encompassing the Brady v. Maryland line of cases requires a more
nuanced account. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the
government violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
if it fails to provide criminal defendants with information favorable to them
and material to guilt or punishment, without regard to the prosecutor’s
knowledge or intent concerning the information and its character.207 Part I
discussed the scope of Brady with regard to pretrial reliability concerns—in
particular, the limiting of Brady doctrine to information known by the state
to be favorable to the defense (and thus excluding “potentially” exculpatory
information such as untested forensic evidence), and the cabining of Brady
to the trial sphere (thus precluding a constitutional obligation to disclose at
least impeachment evidence prior to trial).208 The point for present purposes is to explore what the Court offers as justification for so limiting the
204 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791–92 & nn. 9–10, 794 (1977).
205 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 n.9
(1978) (noting that potential for abuse of charging discretion “has led to many recommendations that the prosecutor’s discretion should be controlled by means of either internal or
external guidelines” including from the ABA and ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure for Criminal Justice).
206 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
207 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963).
208 See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
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scope of what the Due Process Clause would require from the state from the
standpoint of affirmative disclosure obligations. And here, quasi-inquisitorialism plays a role befitting the already somewhat fraught relationship
between Brady doctrine and “our” accusatory system.
Brady itself, as the Court has acknowledged, confounded the pure adversary model of criminal adjudication, in which equally positioned adversaries
marshal and present, autonomously, their own best cases,209 and in which
the prosecutor is appropriately understood, at trial, as a zealous advocate of
the state’s litigation position.210 But Brady’s encroachment was slim. The
line of cases from which it drew primary inspiration were those in which the
Court had held that the Constitution prohibited the prosecution from deliberately eliciting known falsehoods at trial, and consistent with that precedential basis the Brady duty was initially limited only to disclosure of evidence the
defense had itself requested.211 Only in subsequent decisions did the Court
push harder on the doctrine’s reflected commitment to adversarialism, in
moving to the understanding that due process required the state to shoulder
a positive disclosure duty, irrespective of action by the defense; Brady is no
longer about “withholding” evidence, but rather derogation of an affirmative
responsibility to provide it.212
The rationale for this “departure from a pure adversary model,” according to the Court in United States v. Bagley, was the prosecutor’s unique hybrid
role that “transcends that of an adversary: he ‘is the representative . . . of a
sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done.’ ”213 Significantly, only a decade
after Brady did the Court come to root its logic in the affirmative-duty language of Berger v. United States rather than in the more limited negative prohibition on prosecutorial subornation of perjury.214 But the Court emphasized
in Bagley that the departure was limited—lest “Brady . . . create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery” that “ ‘would entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice’ ”—by “our
adversary system.”215 What emerges from examining decisions in which the
209 See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 115–16 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting
that a narrow Brady rule preserves both fairness of trial and the fundamental approach of
the adversary system); see also Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129 (Carol S.
Steiker ed., 2006).
210 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248–50 (1980).
211 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88.
212 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Giles, 386 U.S. at 116 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
213 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.6 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
214 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110–11 (1976) (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88).
215 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.7 (quoting Giles, 386 U.S. at 117 (Harlan, J., dissenting));
see also Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1982) (“Brady could have led to a system in which
the prosecutor gathers and assembles all the facts—those helpful to his case, those neutral,
and those favorable to the defense—and reveals the package completely. . . . Such a devel-
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Court has drawn the outer boundaries of Brady doctrine, as well as those in
which it has maintained or expanded the doctrine’s scope, is a view that the
fullest flowering of the Berger ideal is secured not through judicial constitutional oversight but rather through bureaucratic structures internal to
prosecutorial offices and a broader network of professional regulation.
Consider one of the most significant recent decisions announcing
Brady’s limits—the Court’s opinion in United States v. Ruiz, holding that the
due process based disclosure requirement embodied in the Brady line is
solely a trial right, and that prosecutors need not provide impeachment evidence prior to entry of a plea.216 The broader factual context in which
Ruiz’s claim arose is important; Ruiz had declined to enter into a “fast track”
plea bargain with federal prosecutors, in which she would have received a
substantially discounted sentence in exchange for waiving her right to receive
several categories of “favorable” evidence, including impeachment evidence.217 As discussed in Part I, the Court’s rejection of Ruiz’s claimed constitutional right to the evidence included in the proffered waiver sounded
significantly in anti-inquisitorial terms, conceptualizing Brady as guaranteeing only a fair trial and entailing no greater affirmative prosecutorial duty in
regard to case investigation or evaluation.218 Yet at the same time, the Ruiz
Court highlighted a number of features of prosecutorial practice—at least in
the specific federal context concerned in the case—that suggested a framework of non-judicial constraint to ensure sufficient information flow, more
than the constitutional baseline, in many cases. The Court pointed to the
“standard” nature of “fast track” plea agreements in the United States Attorney’s Office at issue, and placed particular importance on the fact that such
agreements included a promise to disclose evidence actually bearing on
“innocence.”219 Additionally, the Court took significant note of the internal
Department of Justice practice governing disclosure of information concerning witnesses, echoed in statutory and regulatory framework, suggesting that
prosecutors’ expertise in weighing the benefits and burdens of disclosure was
both guided and owed deference.220 Thus, not only did the Ruiz Court distinguish exculpatory from impeachment evidence (a point noted by

opment would transform the nature of the prosecutorial office. Instead of preparing his
case as an adversary—selecting and emphasizing helpful facts while deliberately passing by
those less advantageous—the prosecutor would instead resemble the neutral magistrate in
the inquisitorial system.”).
216 536 U.S. 622, 628–33 (2002).
217 Id. at 625.
218 See supra Section I.B.
219 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623, 625; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622
(No. 01-595) (reflecting questioning on prosecutors’ ethical and internal rule-based obligation not to prosecute absent belief in guilt).
220 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631–32 (citing congressional testimony of a former Acting Assistant Attorney General, discovery-related provisions of the U.S. Code, and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure).
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many),221 but more importantly it did so in reliance on prosecutors’ regularized, professionally developed commitment to disclose at least evidence of
straightforward exculpatory value. (The question of whether the Constitution so required was implicitly deferred.)
But the fullest, and perhaps most notorious, flowering of the Court’s
quasi-inquisitorial conception of the quasi-inquisitorial prosecutorial role was
on display in the Court’s ruling in Connick v. Thompson, which rejected the
viability of a § 1983 suit for Brady violations brought against the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, following a fourteen million dollar jury verdict
for the formerly death-sentenced plaintiff.222 The Court reasoned that
where a plaintiff could show a complete absence of Brady training for Orleans Parish prosecutors, but could prove the existence of Brady violations only
in a single case (in Thompson’s instance, the admitted hiding of exculpatory
blood evidence by a trial prosecutor, and the apparent cover-up of that fact
by others in the office), no civil rights action could lie; such allegations failed
to come within the rule that county entities may be sued where their inaction
creates an “obvious” risk of constitutional wrongdoing by employees.223 In so
holding, the Court depicted prosecutors as operating in a totalizing and
mutually reinforcing network of bureaucratic and professional constraints;
not only are prosecutors formally trained in the substance of law, both in law
school and throughout their careers, but they also (putatively) work within a
hierarchy of office supervision (including direct personal supervision and
promulgated training and policies), and are “subject to an ethical regime”
portrayed by the court as not simply hortatory but rather substantively specific and disciplinarily rigorous.224 In such a context, neither the missteps of
a few errant prosecutors in Thompson’s case,225 nor even complete inattention by the district attorney himself, could upset the balance of an otherwise
well-functioning regime that obviated the need for legal oversight.
The outcome and reasoning in Connick have been widely criticized on
the ground that the Court’s presumption of functional bureaucratic and professional checks was belied by reality and bordered on the cynical.226 And
221 See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1441–42 (2011); Wiseman, supra note 8, at
992–93.
222 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
223 Id. at 1361.
224 Id. at 1361–63 (“Among prosecutors’ unique ethical obligations is the duty to produce Brady evidence to the defense.”).
225 Id. (noting that Court does “not assume that prosecutors will always make correct
Brady decisions”).
226 See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other
Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 716–17 (2011);
Moore, supra note 82, at 1330; Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 914 (2012); David Keenan et
al., Note, The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing
Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 203, 204 (2011).
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yet, at least to the latter charge, the Court has evinced a consistent and seemingly more sincere view in other recent decisions on Brady claims, even going
so far in two recent cases to suggest that prosecutors are in a sense legally
bound by disclosure standards that actually exceed the Brady test requiring
that evidence be both favorable and material to the outcome of a case—and
that the source and enforcement of that obligation is both subconstitutional
and largely internal to the prosecutorial office and profession. Of course,
the Court has repeatedly indicated that it presumed prosecutors would both
exceed the constitutional floor set by Brady, as prosecutors “anxious about
tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence” even
if it is doubtfully material.227 The Court has also long drawn on a presumed
bureaucratic prosecutorial tradition in lodging the disclosure duty with the
state regardless of actual knowledge of favorable information in possession of
other law enforcement actors. Prosecutors’ offices shoulder a responsibility
to establish “procedures and regulations . . . to insure communication of all
relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it”228—
indeed, a responsibility so core to their function that they enjoy absolute
immunity for that (concededly) administrative task.229
But in two recent cases the Court suggested, albeit somewhat obscurely,
a more far-reaching view concerning the scope of prosecutorial obligation
and the interplay of constitutional and subconstitutional oversight. The first
pass came in Cone v. Bell, a case presenting a Brady claim brought in federal
habeas proceedings following a state conviction. The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower federal court determination that the Brady claim was not
procedurally barred, and also determined, applying the long-established
Brady due process test, that evidence that materially mitigated Cone’s eligibility for a death sentence was improperly withheld.230 In so holding, a footnote in Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court made what might have been
dismissed as a passing reference to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
which require disclosure of all favorable evidence to the defense, regardless
of materiality.231 And yet it was not so blithely ignored, as Chief Justice Roberts pointedly disclaimed the legal relevance of that reference in his concurring opinion.232 The cause for alarm may well have been generated by the
striking and lengthy exchange at oral argument in Cone, in which Justices
Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter aggressively challenged the state’s position that
a prosecutor’s judgment as to the immateriality of evidence obviated the
legal obligation to disclose.233
227 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
108 (1976)).
228 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
229 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009).
230 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 452 (2009).
231 Id. at 470 n.15.
232 See id. at 477–78 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
233 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–35, Cone, 556 U.S. 449 (No. 07-1114).
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But notwithstanding the Chief Justice’s admonishment, the relevance of
subconstitutionally enforced discovery obligations reared its head again two
terms later, in Smith v. Cain, a case featuring another claimed Brady violation
in Orleans Parish.234 Perhaps taking a cue from the Court’s opinion in Cone,
the ABA submitted a brief as amicus curiae, urging the Court to recognize
that prosecutors are bound by ethical standards that exceed the constitutional baseline—in particular state disciplinary rules modeled after ABA
Model Rule 3.8(d), which requires all favorable evidence to be disclosed
regardless of materiality, and which standard had been adopted by the state
of Louisiana prior to the prosecution in Smith.235 The brief prompted a
pitched response from amicus curiae National District Attorneys Association
(the only amicus submitted on behalf of the respondent State of Louisiana),
which lambasted the ABA’s attempt to foist its Model Rules upon the Court
and the states, who together occupy the field of prosecutorial regulation
through constitutional and statutory standards.236 Picking up on the import
of the exchange by amici, the oral argument once again featured extended
comments by multiple Justices (a motley ideological lineup of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Sotomayor) reflecting their view that prosecutors were not
just ethically but in fact legally obligated to disclose all favorable evidence—
regardless of whether the Brady standard provided any constitutionally based
relief.237
Critically, in both Cone and Smith, the Justices aggressively challenged
the states’ position that the Court’s past observation that “the prudent prosecutor will err on the side of transparency”238 committed the disclosure decision wholly to the discretion of individual prosecuting attorneys.239 Thus,
there is reason to think that many on the Court view prosecutors as primarily
constrained at the trial level not by Brady doctrine but rather by professional
standards of conduct, reflected in model and state promulgated disciplinary
rules, and enforced (if at all) by bar committees and the types of internal
234 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
235 Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5,
6–12, Smith, 132 S. Ct. 627 (No. 10-8145).
236 Smith Brief of National District Attorneys Association, supra note 124, at 8–18.
237 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, 48–49, 52, Smith, 132 S. Ct. 627 (No. 10-8145),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-8145
.pdf [hereinafter Smith Transcript of Oral Argument] (noting the views of Justices
Sotomayor, Kennedy, and Scalia that the legal issue of whether disclosure was required was
separate from the question of materiality).
238 Cone, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439
(1995); United States v. Bagley 473 U.S. 667, 711 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)).
239 Smith Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 237, at 46, 48–49, 52 (noting the
views of Justices Sotomayor, Kennedy, and Scalia that the legal issue of whether disclosure
was required was separate from question of materiality); see Transcript of Oral Argument at
33–35, Cone, 556 U.S. 449 (No. 07-1114) (Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter challenging the state’s position that a prosecutor’s judgment as to the immateriality of evidence
obviated the legal obligation to disclose).
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office policies that featured prominently in the Connick and Ruiz decisions.
In other words, where anti-inquisitorialism sets the outer limits of constitutional Brady doctrine, quasi-inquisitorialism is imagined to pick up the slack.
Critically, here, as with police, the extent to which quasi-inquisitorial
conditions are imagined, posited rather than verified, is significant. The U.S.
Attorney’s Manual is a rare example (and an often-criticized one at that) of
comprehensive prosecutorial guidance and rulemaking.240 Professional ethics and discipline is a far cry from the functional check on prosecutorial overstepping that the Court portrays.241 There is an unfortunate irony here, one
that Part III will aim to cut through. The Court’s largely distorted portrayal
of the depth of quasi-inquisitorial structures effectively blocks efforts to
address perceived accuracy and fairness deficits either through more robust
conceptions of adversarialism—the injection, for example, of greater evidentiary disclosure and formal rights of consultation into the plea bargaining
process, as Judge Lynch urged two decades ago—or through fully realized
quasi-inquisitorial inroads, the formalization, say, of requirements concerning bureaucratic checks or internal procedural constraint in charging or
discovery.242
C.

Taking Stock

The foregoing discussion problematizes the completeness of adversarial
and anti-inquisitorial narratives in accounting for the deference extended to
pretrial activity by the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence. It is worth
asking why the quasi-inquisitorial narrative this Article identifies would have
emerged.
To begin, and as previous sections foreshadowed, the Court’s growing
antipathy toward the exclusionary rule plays an important role, particularly
in the growing interest in and purported identification of meaningful
bureaucratic controls and professionalism in policing. Retrenchment of
Fourth Amendment suppression remedies began in the early 1970s with the
Burger Court’s embrace of deterrence in United States v. Calandra as the sole
rationale justifying exclusion of evidence per the exclusionary rule.243 But
Calandra ushered in not only the deterrence touchstone but also an express
cost-benefit framework for exclusionary remedies, and in so doing placed a
premium on the Court’s, and litigants’, identification of alternatives to judicial oversight that might satisfactorily assure Fourth Amendment compli240 See Barkow, supra note 22, at 875 & n.19; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to
Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1389 (2009) (describing the U.S. Attorney’s Manual as “noncommittal pablum-language”).
241 See generally Keenan, supra note 227.
242 See Lynch, supra note 23, at 2147–49.
243 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”); see also Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling
for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 671–72
(2011) (tracing this doctrinal progression).
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ance.244 Unsurprisingly, then, judicial as well as scholarly debates about the
exclusionary rule, and the possibility of creating a “good faith exception” to
it, were substantially focused on the relationship between the exclusionary
remedy and what many took to be enhancement of police professionalism—
with some opponents of exclusion arguing that it functioned to diminish that
trend by creating an external incentive for police to lie or fabricate in order
to avoid loss of reliable evidence that would convict the guilty.245 By the
1980s, and especially after the Court formalized a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, the Court had a reliable faction of justices keen for opportunities to make that exception the rule, and hence it is no surprise (given
the dynamics of certiorari) that many of the search and seizure cases heard
by the Court provided opportunities for the Court to hold up non-judicial
mechanisms of police oversight.
Importantly, but unsurprisingly, the Court’s focus on the ills of exclusion
in the Fourth Amendment context spilled over to other constitutional arenas
bearing upon police-generated evidence. So too, in turn, did the Court’s
rhetorical reliance on institutional guarantees of reliability spread to other
pretrial contexts. Thus, in in Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court cited its thenrecent exclusionary rule cases in noting that “inflexible rules of exclusion
that may frustrate rather than promote justice have not been viewed recently
by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm.”246 It also harkened to adequate
police incentives to avoid such suggestion in conducting identification procedures, in declining to categorically exclude identification evidence procured
through suggestive police conduct.247 The Court made the same move a
decade later when it rejected reliability as the touchstone for admission of
confessions in Colorado v. Connelly, citing the line of cases limiting the exclusionary rule for the proposition that “[j]urists and scholars uniformly have
recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence.”248
A second and closely related set of observations concerns the role of data
concerning investigative practices, particularly at the federal level, in shaping
the Court’s understanding of what criminal investigation entails—and perhaps partially accounts for an arguably distorted view of the realities of pretrial practice. One feature of the Supreme Court’s criminal docket over the
244 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (attributing prevailing costbenefit calculus to Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348).
245 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 261 n.15 (1983) (White, J., concurring)
(advancing a lengthy defense of the good faith exception and relying significantly on literature concerning discipline and professionalism); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 739–42 (1970); James E. Spiotto, Search
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
243, 275–77 (1973).
246 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977).
247 Id. at 112 & n.12, 113.
248 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448–49
(1976)).
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last three decades has been its increasingly federal focus, both in the direct
subject matter of the cases and in the manner in which the issues have been
presented to the Court.249 There are at least three factors contributing to
this phenomenon. First, the scope and volume of federal criminal law
enforcement has expanded over the last four decades, such that the relative
volume and importance of federal criminal matters has increased—leading
to an uptick in federal criminal cases in the Court’s cert pool, and in its
smaller pool of accepted cases.250 Second, at the same time, the law has
shifted to significantly restrict federal review of state criminal convictions
through habeas corpus in a manner that limits the opportunity for state criminal procedure matters to come before the Court. Indeed, long before the
enactment of congressionally imposed restrictions on federal habeas review
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),251 the
Supreme Court had dramatically curtailed its review of state criminal proceedings, including by essentially eliminating a raft of state-based Fourth
Amendment cases from its docket when it held in Stone v. Powell that federal
habeas review was unavailable for unconstitutional search and seizure claims
in state convictions.252 And thirdly, the enhanced role of the Solicitor General’s Office in Supreme Court litigation has meant not only that federal
criminal cases selected for certiorari application by the federal government
have been selected for review by the Court at a far higher-than-average rate,
but also that the federal perspective on criminal procedure matters has been
heard by the Court even in state cases by virtue of the Solicitor General’s
amicus participation.253 All of this supports the intuition that, increasingly,
when Supreme Court Justices summon to mind an ideal type of criminal
investigative functions, they imagine not the work of state police and prosecu249 See, e.g., Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty,
96 VA. L. REV. 719, 741 (2010).
250 This phenomenon has been widely noted. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 22, at
884–85; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1998 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
THE THIRD BRANCH (1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/
99-01-01/The_1998_Year-End_Report_of_the_Federal_Judiciary.aspx (last visited Nov. 23,
2014) (addressing the federalization of crime and impact on federal court dockets); TASK
FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW 15–16 & n.28 (1998).
251 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104,
110 Stat. 1214, 1218–19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (d)–(e), (i) (2012));
Frost & Lindquist, supra note 249, at 742. AEDPA’s jurisdictional hurdles mean that where
the Court has taken cases arising under § 2254, the issues presented have nearly exclusively
concerned procedural habeas matters rather than the merits of constitutional questions
and the attendant factual issues of law enforcement conduct. See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 107–08 (2012).
252 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976); see also John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the
“Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 262 (2006).
253 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing
Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1333–34, 1357 (2010); Adam D. Chandler, Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121
YALE L.J. 725, 728 (2011).
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tors but rather (based on what they are repeatedly learning in briefing and
oral argument) that of the FBI, U.S. attorneys, and other federal personnel.
Significantly, as noted at several points in the preceding discussion, the sorts
of quasi-inquisitorial checks to which the Court increasingly adverts in its pretrial criminal procedure jurisprudence have been far more featured in federal investigative work than in the (far more significant as a matter of
volume) world of state criminal practice.
A closely related point concerns a more widely noted and consequential
shift in recent Supreme Court practice, namely, the increased specialization
and professionalization of the advocates who practice before it.254 Part and
parcel of this has been the rise of amicus practice, to significant effect for
certain categories of amici and certain categories of cases. In the criminal
procedure context, two specific data points are worth noting: first, the apparently significant effect of amicus submissions by two public interest organizations with significant activity around criminal justice issues, the ACLU and
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE), and the role of the Solicitor General.255 All three parties, from varying perspectives, are inclined and
able to place before the Court evidence of systemic practices—in the case of
the ACLU and AELE due to their status as repeat players and clearinghouses
of such information, and in the case of the Solicitor General because federal
law enforcement and prosecution is, as a matter of fact, subject to far greater
internal rulemaking and hierarchical administration than most state systems.256 Significantly, however, at least one study of ACLU and AELE amicus
practice prior to 1982 found that the latter organization was far more
254 Indeed, the current Chief Justice has so remarked. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral
Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 68 (2005),
available at http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/tmkeck/Readings/Roberts_2005.pdf; see also
Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the
Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1488 (2008).
255 See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Solicitor General Influence and Agenda Setting
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 POL. RES. Q. 765, 766 (2011); Gregg Ivers & Karen O’Connor,
Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae Participation and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties
Union and Americans for Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969–1982, 9 LAW &
POL’Y 161, 172 (1987). The ACLU frequently litigates and aims to participate as amicus in
criminal cases raising privacy or liberty concerns, including much of the Fourth Amendment docket. Americans for Effective Law Enforcement “was incorporated in 1966 . . . for
the purpose of establishing an ‘organized voice’ for the law-abiding citizens regarding this
country’s crime problem, and to lend support to professional law enforcement.” About
AELE, AMS. FOR EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT, http://www.aele.org/About.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). In particular, the AELE aimed to curtail the exclusionary rule. See
Ivers & O’Connor, supra, at 164–65. The AELE has frequently submitted amicus briefs on
behalf of law enforcement interests, beginning as early as 1967 in Terry v. Ohio. See Brief of
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, as Amicus Curiae, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (No. 67).
256 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1000–01 (2009) (contrasting the hierarchical criminal justice
administration model of the federal government and a small number of states with the
majority approach); David M. Rosenzweig, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solici-
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inclined to supply the Court with data on actual practices, while the ACLU’s
advocacy trafficked more heavily in constitutional principle.257 Moreover,
given the frequency of Solicitor General participation in all criminal cases—
state and federal—and its rate of participation in oral argument, descriptive
accounts received by the Court increasingly reflect the conduct of federal
and not state actors.258 The combined consequence of frequent litigation
featuring the practices of federal criminal justice actors, with regular amicus
participation by an organization dedicated to placing before the Court evidence of successful police practices that obviate judicial supervision, is an
arguably distorted presentation of data on internal controls and police
professionalism.
That leads to a final point. Quasi-inquisitorialism has, in the main, functioned as a preservationist device. It has provided the Court cover in many
cases to maintain a posture of deference to pretrial activities, even in the face
of suggestion or evidence that the “presumption of regularity” attending
those activities does not hold in the case before the Court, or even in the
main. This was true in the Court’s early relaxation of the warrant requirement for checkpoints, as litigants and advocates in the political sphere suggested that law enforcement was engaging in increasingly more intrusive and
less reliable investigative tactics; adverting to a semblance of bureaucratic
checks in the cases before the Court, as in Sitz, provided cover from deafness
to those concerns.259 It may be even more true in the current context of
DNA exonerations and the growing legal and social science literature
addressing the types of pretrial reliability concerns discussed in Part I. As the
criminal justice system’s potential accuracy defects have become more publicly evident and legally salient—including through the mechanism of concerted amicus practice by reliability-minded reformers and scholars260—the
Court might well feel challenged to provide some justificatory counterpoint
to its general adherence to the old procedural structure.261 Reliance on
tor General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2087 (1994) (discussing the role of the Solicitor General in
screening cases for certiorari).
257 See Ivers & O’Connor, supra note 255, at 170–72.
258 See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 253, at 1357 & n.170.
259 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 21, Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990) (No. 88-1897).
260 The earliest amicus brief filed by any innocence project in the Supreme Court,
judged by a search of Westlaw’s Supreme Court Briefs database, was in 2005 in House v.
Bell. See Brief of The Innocence Project, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (No. 04-8990). The same database reveals that since
that time innocence projects have been amici in at least twelve cases in which certiorari was
accepted by the Court.
261 See, e.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 727–28 (2012) (engaging arguments by amici concerning susceptibility of eyewitnesses to error); id. at 738 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (“It would be one thing if the passage of time had cast doubt on the empirical premises of our precedents. But just the opposite has happened. A vast body of scientific literature has reinforced every concern our precedents articulated nearly a halfcentury ago, though it merits barely a parenthetical mention in the majority opinion.”);
Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support
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putative quasi-inquisitorial attributes of police and prosecutors permits the
Court to offer some response, provided by litigants keen to preserve the challenged discretion.262 By that account, quasi-inquisitorialism frequently represents a kind of motivated adaptation to the anxiety introduced by the postDNA criminal justice world.
III.

QUASI-INQUISITORIAL INROADS

While “ours” is probably best thought of as an essentially accusatorial
system of criminal adjudication, the discussion in Part II reveals that this
characterization does not fully capture even the Court’s own account of the
structural features that contextualize choices between deference and oversight in the pretrial realm. Not only does the Court in fact have an operative
conception of those features—a point overlooked in the scholarship—but
that conception, trafficking as it does in conceptions of law enforcement and
prosecutorial bureaucratic regularity, and professional and organizational
expertise and restraint, has at least as much resonance with leading accounts
of the investigative and prosecutorial apparatus of Continental, inquisitorial
systems as with the more autonomous conception of the American legal
adversary.263 But where does identification of the “quasi-inquisitorial” features of that doctrine leave us? Returning to the examples of pretrial reliability concerns that opened this Article, what does this account offer those
concerned about police reliance on questionable forensic or identification
evidence, or about limited defense knowledge of, or challenge to, the prosecution’s case prior to a plea?264
This final Part suggests that, armed with the inquisitorial narrative, those
concerned with the reliability deficit and pretrial discretion might engage in
more exacting scrutiny and more potent advocacy concerning oversight of
pretrial criminal practices—whether emanating from constitutional dictate,
state law, or internal institutional design. The aim here is not to endorse any
particular set of legal rules or institutional arrangements to mitigate the reliability deficit that flows from broad pretrial investigative and prosecutorial discretion, though the discussion takes as the overarching goal implementation
of some set of reforms to investigative practices, disclosure, and even plea
bargaining of the type that have, as Part I argues, garnered (in broad brush
strokes) a significant consensus among scientists, social scientists, and legal
of Respondent at 5–25, Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009) (No. 07-1356) (discussing
systemic problems of reliability in the use of informants).
262 Thus, in Kansas v. Ventris, where the case before the Court featured use of an apparently unreliable informant whose conversations with the defendant violated the Fifth
Amendment, with police knowledge, the Department of Justice nevertheless took (and the
Court embraced) the view that police professionalism enforced through internal review
and discipline, and prosecutorial ethics enforced through state and internal agency guidelines, sufficed to prevent misuse of informants in the ordinary case. Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28, Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (No. 07-1356).
263 See supra notes 18, 24, 112–17 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
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scholars.265 Rather, the discussion here is more conceptual and strategic in
nature, suggesting ways in which marshaling quasi-inquisitorialism might
alter the terms of the debate on which these types of proposals might be met.
This Part first offers two lessons that cut across specific doctrines or activities,
and then turns to police investigation, discovery, and plea-bargaining to
briefly sketch some specific sites for applying those lessons.
A.

Cross-cutting Strategic Lessons: Lower Court and Legislative Advocacy,
and Data Gathering

Two cross-cutting strategic insights that might be gained from the above
discussion are worth highlighting. The first echoes the call of many scholars
and advocates to embrace with vigor the legal reform possibilities presented
by investing attention and resources in lower court and legislative advocacy to
as much if not a greater extent than Supreme Court practice.266 This may
seem a curious remark to follow upon a doctrinal exploration that took
Supreme Court jurisprudence as its nearly exclusive focus. But the point
flows from the frank concession of Part II that much of the impetus and
traction for quasi-inquisitorial narratives in the Supreme Court’s pretrial
criminal procedure jurisprudence has emanated from that narrative’s fit with
preexisting jurisprudential (and even political) priorities. Those priorities
are not equally as entrenched among state courts or among legislatures. Nor
are state courts and legislatures, and their constituent members, inclined to
take as their touchstone for the current realities of pretrial police and
prosecutorial work the relatively rarified world of federal criminal
practice.267
And yet at the same time there is among state courts significant inclination to follow the Court’s pace setting in constitutional criminal procedure,
even where state constitutions would permit different and more expansive
doctrinal moves.268 This is likely the result of some combination of limited
state court resources, the choices of advocates, and the cultural hegemony of
the Court’s account of “our” system of criminal justice. The same trend can
take hold even in legislative advocacy, particularly where powerful criminal
265 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 62, at 129–30, 160; SIMON, supra note 6, at 13–16;
Brown, supra note 13, at 1645; Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 125 (2008) (describing pretrial accuracy-enhancing reforms as “one of the most significant efforts to reform our criminal procedure in decades” and noting “it largely has not
originated in the courts”); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1014 (2005).
267 See supra Section II.C.
268 See generally Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court “Revolution,” 74
JUDICATURE 190 (1991) (debunking the myth that new federalism has yielded substantially
more progressive state criminal procedure guarantees). Although state courts exhibited a
trend of departing from the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings, divergence in other areas
of criminal procedure has been far more limited. See James W. Diehm, New Federalism and
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. REV. 223,
239–42 (1996).
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justice stakeholders—police and prosecutors in particular—deploy constitutional argumentation and anti-inquisitorialism as a modality of political persuasion to characterize subconstitutional reforms to pretrial oversight and
practices as out of step with “our” adversarial system.269 Making use of the
Court’s counterpunctual theme of quasi-inquisitorialism can arrest these
dynamics. This instinct is borne out by the access to evidence jurisprudence
discussed above, where the approach of California v. Trombetta to substantively
examine actual evidence preservation practices as a feature of due process
analysis, though essentially abandoned by the Court in Youngblood, remained
influential in some state court due process tests.270 That could not occur
without the work of advocates urging the Trombetta standard as the preferable
decision rule.
A second and related insight concerns data, its assemblage, and its
deployment in criminal practice as well as political advocacy. There has been
a salutary uptick in academic attention to actual law enforcement and
prosecutorial practices, particularly those that embody examples of the sorts
of “best practices” that those concerned with pretrial reliability issues would
hope to take hold. But when it comes to understanding what is in fact occurring “on the ground,” as it were, data about actual law enforcement practices
are notoriously sparse.271 Filling that data vacuum is critical for parties aiming to call the Court’s quasi-inquisitorial bluff by rebutting the current presumption of adequate internal and professional controls with documentation
in individual cases of, or systemic departures from, best (or at least regular)
practices.
As Section II.C described, there are indications that the empirical evidence the Court has grabbed for has a notable skew. Both by virtue of its
heavily federal criminal docket and because of the significant role of the
Solicitor General as amicus in state cases, both meaningful data as well as
mere anecdote are likely at best to capture a sense of federal practices—not
the mine-run of state and local activities. Expanded amicus practice before
the Court, especially by organizational actors with a long-term investment in
gathering this type of data, could change that dynamic. But even so, given
the limited volume of cases decided by the Court each term, such information comes too late in the form of a Supreme Court brief. State and lower
court criminal litigation could profit from featuring more evidence of patterns of law enforcement practices. Criminal defense attorneys—individually
or, more effectively, by leveraging bar associations and other networks—
might well consider making greater use of collaborative information sharing
and open-record laws, as well as partnering earlier on with the civil rights bar
269 See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text; infra subsection III.B.2.
270 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
271 See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and
Change: Into the Twenty-first Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55, 75–76 (2010) (discussing the limitation of too general of data for researching policing); Ronald F. Wright, Fragmented Users
of Crime Predictions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 92–93 (2010) (discussing the late and spotty adoption of data-gathering and analysis technology by law enforcement).
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which is often a repository for systemic information about law enforcement
practices.272
B.
1.

Specific Applications

Investigation

The fundamental reliability challenge posed by the substantial discretion
afforded police in conducting criminal investigations is the twin risk that
unreliable evidence will be introduced into the stream of proof, and that the
harm will not be undone by courts (who exercise the lightest of gatekeeping
touches with regard to some of the most problematic forms of evidence), or
the institutional actors who enjoy deference (but for a variety of cognitive,
motivational, or organizational features may lack adequate incentive or
opportunity to catch error). As Part I recounted, the good news on this score
has been the heightened attention to these concerns in academic literature
and criminal justice professions, and the inroads that have begun to be made
in bringing evidence generation and usage more in line with better or best
practices—for example, the growing push to standardize eyewitness identification in accordance with scientific research, to enhance scrutiny and quality
in the forensic sciences, and to increase the transparency and reliability of
interrogation. The bad news is the extent to which outliers remain—indeed,
on balance, they likely remain the norm.273
What quasi-inquisitorialism offers here might be a reinforcement mechanism for bringing slow adopters into the fold—perhaps even by virtue of formal legal doctrine. Consider on this score the Court’s recent decision in
Florida v. Harris, in a term when the Court was twice asked to consider what
Fourth Amendment scrutiny might be brought to bear on the police use of
drug-sniffing dogs.274 In evaluating whether the dog alert on which a search
warrant application relied sufficed to create probable cause—especially given
the dog’s poor track record of false alerts against Mr. Harris himself—the
Court held, unanimously, that dog sniff evidence deserved no more and no
less than the same flexible “totality of the circumstances” test adopted by the
Court in Illinois v. Gates.275 On the one hand, this holding had the reliability272 Significantly, many of the most noteworthy recent state court decisions adopting
rules aimed at more rigorous judicial gatekeeping of police-generated evidence—among
them the New Jersey and Oregon Supreme Court decisions incorporating social science
research on eyewitness identification best practices into rules governing admissibility and
jury instructions—featured amicus briefs by institutional stakeholders (including in both
instances the Innocence Project), extensive fact-finding (including in the case of New
Jersey by an appointed special master), and opinions situating the decisions in a factually
rich local and national context. See State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 694–97 (Or. 2012) (en
banc); Report of the Special Master, State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011) (No. A-808), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20
BRIEF%20.pdf%20%2800621142%29.pdf.
273 See supra notes 73–82 and accompanying text.
274 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1053 (2013); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
275 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1054–56; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
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diminishing consequence of rejecting efforts by state courts to fashion standards for “reasonableness” that incorporate attributes of reliability appropriate to certain categories of scientific evidence. Thus, the Court rejected the
Florida Supreme Court’s test requiring written documentation of field performance and other measures deemed by the court to be appropriate indicia
of scientific reliability.276 On the other hand, the Court signaled that law
enforcement organizations would be held to a minimal threshold of validation, one essentially tracking standards adopted by the field of expertise
implicated by the evidence at issue. Thus, police must point either to “satisfactory performance in a certification or training program” by a “bona fide
organization,” or at least recent completion of a law enforcement-sponsored
“training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.”277 Like
the Court’s averment in recent exclusionary rule jurisprudence to the relevance of “systemic negligence,” the standard, even if deferential to the law
enforcement field, does both acknowledge emerging trends in evidentiary
standardization and prevent law enforcement organizations from opting out
of such trends. Advocates might urge lower courts to take seriously the
Court’s invitation to condition deference on adoption of meaningful standards and training, and might even find a receptive judicial audience in
those courts that, like the Florida Supreme Court, were previously inclined to
engage in relatively exacting review of a canine’s demonstrated reliability.278
Recall finally an additional, more specific, and more recent feature of
the Court’s depiction of the quasi-inquisitorial investigative apparatus—an
emerging formalization of the prosecutorial oversight function. Exemplary is
the Court’s observation (albeit in dicta) in Messerschmidt v. Millender that an
officer’s consultation with his supervisor and a prosecutor supported the reasonableness of a magistrate’s probable cause determination (even vis-à-vis
arguable facial overbreadth in the warrant’s scope).279 On balance, although
the calculus is not straightforward, it would likely enhance the reliability of
pretrial activity and decisionmaking if police action and evaluation of evidence were subject to prosecutorial scrutiny earlier rather than later.280 And
therefore, one might be encouraged by the possibility that law enforcement
organizations and prosecutor offices might collectively take a cue from the
Court to move toward more closely coordinated work, incentivized by
enhanced protection against judicial second-guessing of law enforcement
decisions.
Of course, the danger is that what is incentivized by doctrinal consideration of these arrangements is not formalized, independent review by prosecutors, but rather ad hoc and deferential sign-off on police decisionmaking.
276 Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055.
277 Id. at 1057 & n.3 (citing police dog tactics literature).
278 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1994); State v. Barker, 850
P.2d 885, 893 (Kan. 1993); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Tenn. 2000).
279 Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1249 (2012); see supra subsection
II.A.1.c.
280 See, e.g., Richman, supra note 158, at 819.
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This is a risk that is amply borne in the status quo. One might hope both
that prosecutors formally and openly placing their imprimatur on police
decisionmaking would in most cases have adequate self-interest to exercise
more searching review, and that courts following the Messerschmidt approach
would be receptive to evidence (of the individual or systemic variety) that
undermined the proffered independence of review.281 Rather than sheer
hope, however, litigants should push back on reflexive invocation of supervisory sign-off and interrogate practices of review, pushing courts to draw decisional distinctions between rubber-stamping and the putative institutional
counter-weight that prosecutorial oversight is intended by the doctrine to
represent.282
2.

Discovery

Expanding and accelerating defense access to information adduced in
the state’s investigation is one of the most promising mechanisms to remedy
reliability-diminishing features of pretrial activities. Greater parity in information permits scrutiny of investigative practices rather than simply of the
constructed fruits of those endeavors;283 affirmative access to the state’s
investigatory apparatus, such as extending to the defense a right to test physical evidence or depose the state’s witnesses,284 further ameliorates errors that
might flow from motivated thinking and other causes of tunnel vision; and
advancing the timing of disclosure diminishes the ability of the state to take
advantage of information asymmetries in plea bargaining, and prompts
greater evidence-driven rather than risk-driven negotiation.285 It is clear
from the stability of the Brady doctrine that liberalizing criminal discovery
along such lines will be almost wholly an effort undertaken at the level of
legislative craft, bar disciplinary attention, or the impetus of reform-minded
offices. Efforts in those arenas have enjoyed notable, but ultimately isolated,
successes.
281 Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249–50.
282 Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971) (holding that the issuance
of a search warrant by the New Hampshire Attorney General did not meet the standard of
“neutral and detached” review); United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“Referrals by states for federal prosecution need not be controlled through express policy
so long as prosecutors are not acting as mere rubber stamps for charging decisions made
by law enforcement.”).
283 See Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1091–95 (2014) (discussing the need for criminal defendants to participate actively in the pretrial investigative process).
284 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a) (providing for criminal depositions); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.43 (providing a pretrial right to DNA testing of all forensic evidence in
capital cases).
285 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 70, at 2493, 2531–32; Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel,
Trial Judges, and Evidence Production Protocols, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 148–49 (2012);
Lynch, supra note 23, at 2147–48.
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The key political barrier is as predictable as it is formidable: continued
resistance by the organized prosecutorial bar.286 Various factors animate the
resistance, including perhaps most prominently cited concerns for witness
safety and, especially at the federal level, national security.287 Importantly,
however, the rhetoric of anti-inquisitorialism is frequently deployed as justification for adhering to the status quo of highly cabined criminal discovery.
Federal and state prosecutors have in a variety of forums consistently
adverted to the limited rather than expansive role for prosecutorial disclosure in “our” adversary system of criminal justice, and the appropriate balance already struck by the Court’s constitutional doctrine, to urge lawmakers
and courts that the rightness of prosecutors’ policy preferences is reinforced
by consistency with our existing legal order.288
Insights from the quasi-inquisitorial account might alter the terms of this
debate. Advocates should make clear to courts, legislatures, and prosecutors
themselves the extent to which the Court’s Brady decisions reflect a strong
presumption that discovery in operation both exceeds Brady’s constitutional
floor (in particular by sweeping more broadly than “material” evidence) and
is enforced by a mutually reinforcing network of internal office policymaking
and supervision, and state level legal and ethical obligations. Certainly, constitutionally rooted anti-inquisitorial arguments such as those traced above
should be publicly challenged by reference to the Court’s own professed confidence and indeed intention that subconstitutional norms should sweep
more broadly than Brady.289 So too should prosecutorial policymaking and
internal practices with respect to disclosure be brought into the light—
through open records act work, or, even better, through the electoral process
in which most sitting chief prosecutors are formally called to account for
their work.

286 See, e.g., supra note 123 and accompanying text; see also Green, supra note 82, at 681;
Moore, supra note 82, at 1376–77.
287 See, e.g., Ensuring that Federal Prosecutors Meet Discovery Obligations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y
Gen.), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/testimony-of-cole-pdf.
288 See id. (opposing congressional expansion of federal prosecutorial disclosure obligation in part on ground that bill would disrupt balance struck by constitutional doctrine);
Proposed Amendments Hearing, supra note 124 (testimony of Richard Thornburgh, U.S. Att’y,
W.D. Pa); Smith Brief of National District Attorneys Association, supra note 124; Proposed
Changes to RPC 3.8, supra note 124 (“A concern has been raised that suggested subsection
(h) to RPC 3.8(h) is contrary to the adversary system of justice and fundamentally changes
substantive law regarding the prosecutor’s role.”); see also Green, supra note 82, at 655–80
(tracing the Department of Justice’s resistance to reform of Federal Rule 16 on the ground
that a constitutional standard occupies the field).
289 See Letter from Emmett G. Sullivan, supra note 124 (urging expansion of Rule 16
discovery obligations and adverting to Supreme Court’s reliance on ABA standards in Cone
v. Bell).
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Pleas

As a final set of preliminary thoughts, it is worth reflecting on whether
the insights of the Article’s account open up any new ways of thinking about
a seemingly intractable set of concerns surrounding plea bargaining. The
intractability, I suggest, stems from at least two sets of sources. The first is the
deeply embedded causes for skepticism of plea bargaining outcomes, including the evident reliability concerns generated by plea decisions that are uninformed as to the strength of the state’s case (in light of Ruiz) and frequently
made against a backdrop of nearly unconscionable and barely regulated
retail “prices” for crimes, driven by the Court’s stingy substantive scrutiny of
noncapital sentencing as well as prosecutorial charging power.290 The second is the deeply dissatisfying rubric through which the Court views the constitutionality of plea bargaining, namely waiver doctrine, which as it has
evolved seemingly permits any bargain not physically coerced so long as trial
(plea) counsel stands by its terms.291 The question of disclosure is addressed
above, but in the main the circumstances that give rise to the accuracy-based
ills of plea bargaining are more broadly structural and complex than the
instant focus on pretrial rules contemplates. The narrow question raised
here is whether quasi-inquisitorialism assists in bringing to bear some greater
scrutiny of plea bargaining than the doctrinally enshrined constitutional
floor of voluntariness currently ensures. I suggest that it does.
Consider two promising approaches to mitigating plea bargaining’s
accuracy deficit which have been advanced and explored at length by others.
One is to enhance internal prosecutorial rulemaking and supervision with
respect to pleas by, for example, setting standard, transparent, and non-coercive discounts within offices; formalizing channels for defense advocacy in
connection with the deal, including before an audience that lacks the line
prosecutor’s potentially skewed investment in the case; or taking certain waivers off the table—for example waivers of effective assistance of counsel or
subsequent DNA testing, both of which strike at the heart of reliability in
negotiated settlements.292 Another approach urged is greater judicial scrutiny of plea bargaining, or more substantive judicial questioning in the
course of plea allocutions—including, for example, reviewing evidence disclosed, or comparing deals offered to comparator cases.293
Drawing upon the quasi-inquisitorial narrative might enhance the case
for adoption of either, or perhaps most innovatively a combination of, these
approaches. As the discussion in Section II.B demonstrated, one putative
premise for the discretion afforded prosecutors in the pretrial sphere is the
290 See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People
Plead Guilty, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/arti
cles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ (discussing why, in the
view of a federal judge, factually innocent individuals plead guilty).
291 See supra note 72.
292 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 22, at 895–906; Bibas, supra note 256, at 996–1015;
Wright & Miller, supra note 75, at 31–33.
293 See supra notes 70, 82–84 and accompanying text.
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existence of internal and professional regulation and expertise guiding the
judgments that enjoy deference. Concerns about lack of parity in bargaining
have been mitigated in the Court’s mind not just by the presence of presumptively skilled defense counsel, but also by a conceptualization of the
prosecutor’s unique role as offeror of deal terms. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, in
which the Court held constitutionally permissible the “punishment” of a
defendant’s refusal to plead guilty with an exponentially enhanced charge,
was substantially premised on the presumed legitimacy of the prosecutor’s
charge selections.294 United States v. Mezzanatto and Town of Rumery v. Newton,
in which the Court sanctioned the permissibility of plea deals— arguably
countermanding both congressional commitments and broader public interests—featured accounts of the prosecutor’s role that cast her as presumptively pursuing well-reasoned outcomes informed by broader bureaucratic
commitments.295 The aim here is to illuminate a less apparent dynamic in
the Court’s plea bargaining jurisprudence, one rooted not as much in parity
but rather in an embrace of the structurally privileged bargaining position of
the prosecutor, alongside confidence that the privilege will be exercised with
the restraint and regularity dictated by quasi-inquisitorial constraints.
Recovering such a depiction might arm the reform-minded prosecutor
with a politically tractable foothold for internal rulemaking—one, in fact,
that embraces rather than diminishes the centrality of the prosecutorial role
in our system. But courts might too, on their own instance or as a matter of
legislative mandate, take a cue from the Court’s quasi-inquisitorial presumption of prosecutorial decisionmaking and bargaining. Though federal constitutional doctrine allows little space for such a move, legislatively enacted
rules or state due process guarantees might require a (non-waivable) demonstration of the existence of the regularity and rationality presumed by quasiinquisitorialism—perhaps either in the form of documented internal procedures concerning plea offers or alternately, failing that, judicial scrutiny of
plea terms. For present purposes, the key advantage posed by such an
approach would be its arguable consonance with and fulfillment of the
Court’s own account of deference to an operative institutional and professional background against which the prosecutor’s role in plea bargaining is
constrained.
CONCLUSION
The primary focus of this Article has been a positive account of consequential themes in the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure doctrine—in
particular, those features that I have characterized as attributing “quasiinquisitorial” qualities to police and prosecutors in the pretrial domain that
affords those actors significant, at times problematic, discretion. And yet, at
bottom, the questions being asked, and partially answered, are less about law
294 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
295 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 207–08 (1995); Town of Rumery v.
Newton, 480 U.S. 386, 397 (1987).
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as it is than about law as it might be. And in that regard, the intuition animating the preceding discussion is not so much that Supreme Court doctrine
should be taken as the central regulatory vehicle in our criminal justice system, but rather that there are consequences of that jurisprudence—legal,
political, cultural—that ripple beyond rule development or application in
any given case. This also means that the core underlying concerns of this
Article—the dynamics of legal change and reform—are necessarily much
larger questions than can be fully and adequately vetted here. Thus, as
always, the hope is that those in sympathy to the perspective animating this
exploration, and particularly those engaged in the type of on-the-ground,
constitutive work described herein, will further press these lines of inquiry.

